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Money-Back Guarantees in Individual Retirement Accounts:
Still a Good Deal?
1

Introduction
Numerous countries have adopted tax-qualified defined contribution retirement accounts

as a means to fill the gap between retiree income needs and benefits payable under national
social security systems.1 Additionally, many policymakers seek mechanisms to protect savers
against longevity risk and capital market volatility, and one approach has been to require
money-back guarantees for participant contributions. Thus, private financial institutions in
Europe have offered principal guarantees at market prices (Maurer and Schlag, 2003), Japanese
defined contribution plans are required by law to offer at least one guaranteed account (Allianz
Global Investors, nd), and several Latin American nations have instituted government
guarantees for pension savings (e.g. Pennacchi, 1999; Fischer, 1999).
From a policy perspective, requiring retirement account guarantees can be rationalized if
they are conducive to achieving high-priority goals. For example, requiring money-back
guarantees might serve the purpose of fostering private savings, which could reduce retirees’
dependence on state pensions already stressed by population aging (Mercer, 2020). There is
also evidence that many workers are financially unsophisticated and loss averse, both factors
that deter them from saving and investing in the capital market (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell,
2014; Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995; Abdellaoui et al., 2007). Moreover, Calvet et al. (2020)
showed that providing people access to equity-linked products with a capital guarantee boosted
stock market participation and portfolio returns, especially for loss averse households.
Additionally, since women live longer yet tend to be more loss averse than men (Schmidt and

1

For instance, defined contribution or 401(k) retirement saving plans in the U.S. are the primary tax-qualified
mechanism helping private sector workers accumulate retirement assets, now totaling over $5 trillion (ICI, 2018).
Ernst & Young (2017) recently showed that individual retirement accounts are available in most European Union
countries, though the market is highly fragmented across member states. Total assets under management amount
to €600 billion, of which most, €224 billion, is held by the German Riester IRAs.
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Traub, 2002), including money-back guarantees in their retirement plan menus could enhance
their willingness to participate in pension accounts.2
As a case in point, the European Parliament (2019) recently adopted a European
Commission (2017) proposal to establish a Pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP), a
standardized tax-qualified funded defined contribution plan offered by financial institutions
such as asset managers, life insurers, and banks. These accounts – conceptually comparable to
the U.S. Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) – are intended to encourage retirement savings
and allow pension portability for over 200 million workers across the European Union. During
the worker’s accumulation phase, a provider must offer a default option (called the Basic PEPP)
which governs the plan’s investment strategy when the saver provides no instructions on how
to invest the funds. Besides a yearly cap on fees and expenses of 1% of accumulated capital,
this default option requires capital protection, either in form of a money-back guarantee from
the provider, or another risk mitigation technique ensuring that the PEPP saver can recoup the
funds contributed by the end of the accumulation phase.
Nevertheless, while such investment guarantees can protect against shortfall risk and
longevity risk to protect financially-illiterate workers, the economic costs of such guarantees
must be properly understood. In the early part of the 21st century, for instance, money-back
guarantees would have cost around 5% of annual contributions for U.S. Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs) (Lachance and Mitchell, 2003). Yet that research was conducted in the context
of a much higher interest rate environment than is presently the case; since low returns now
appear to be persistent (Horneff et al., 2018), these costs should be reevaluated to determine if
they are now more substantial and might adversely impact their intended effect, which is to
enhance old-age security of private households.

2

Célérier and Vallée (2017) show that catering to the behavioral traits of households is an effective means to
encourage them to invest in savings products, and that this increases the profitability of providers.

3

Previous research is also silent on how such guarantees could shape behavior in the
context of a life cycle framework with endogenous consumption, saving, and portfolio
allocation and location decisions: this is the subject of the present paper. Accordingly, a key
contribution of our study is to build a general model which we use to assess the costs and
benefits of a mandatory money-back pension guarantee. We also examine how such guarantees
affect saving and investment behavior inside and outside of such accounts, and retirement
wellbeing, while incorporating important aspects of the tax structure, social security benefits,
and capital markets (e.g., Cocco and Gomes, 2012; Horneff et al., 2015, 2018). Our research,
therefore, contributes to the rich literature on financial decisionmaking of private households
(see Gomes et al., 2020a, for an overview) using dynamic consumption and portfolio choice
models in discrete time.
As mentioned by Gomes (2020) it is important to develop models that capture the relevant
institutional features of retirememt savings, especially with respect to the tax and the national
social-security system. With respect to the institutional framework, we evaluate the case of the
IRAs adopted in Germany in 2002 under the Riester program.3 This program permits offering
tax-qualified individual retirement accounts, as long as these include embedded mandatory
money-back guarantees. Such accounts are popular, with over 35% of eligible German
employees holding contracts, making them more prevalent than occupational pensions (BörschSupan et al., 2012; 2015). Not only do product providers promise participants a money-back
guarantee during the accumulation phase, but the government also subsidizes contributions (to
a cap) by workers in the form of deferred taxation and direct subsidies. In retirement, benefits
must be paid as guaranteed lifetime income streams.

3

While for the member states of the Euro area the assumption of a uniform capital market with similar interest
rates is reasonable, the institutional framework with respect to the tax and social security systems is still different
(in contrast to the 50 U.S. states). In this respect, it is necessary to focus on one country. In Online Appendix F,
we also address the extent to which the results may be transferable to other countries.
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Our goal is to determine optimal consumption, stock and bond holdings, and
contributions into and withdrawals from the Riester accounts, taking into account capital market
shocks, uncertainty about labor income and remaining lifetimes, and the rich institutional details
relevant to the tax and social security benefit structure. We then compare results with and
without the money-back guarantees, in both ‘normal’ and ‘low return’ environments.
We provide four main findings. First, during what we call ‘historically normal’ capital
market periods, money-back guarantees had only a modest effect on consumption prior to
retirement, but they did reduce post-retirement consumption for about 82.4% of retirees by an
average of 2.9% per year (or €430 annually). This means that eliminating these money-back
guarantees would have boosted old-age consumption for most elderly, even prior to the current
low return regime. Second, in a low interest environment, this type of guarantee has a more
complex impact. On the one hand, many people do benefit from the account guarantee: the
shortfall probability of losing money at age 67 without the guarantee is 18.1%, compared to
6.4% in the ‘normal’ capital market environment. Yet the costs of protection are so high that
81.3% of retirees end up with markedly lower old-age consumption, by an average of 8.3% (or
€950 per year). In addition, consumption during the worklife is also slightly lower with the
guarantee. Third, we show whether implementing an age-based life cycle investment approach
would be a better risk mitigation technique, compared to the money-back guarantee. During a
‘normal’ capital market, we find that life cycle funds provided less lifetime consumption than
guaranteed accounts. But under current market conditions, a life cycle fund with sufficiently
high equity exposure generates greater average old-age consumption than can be expected
under the money-back guarantee. Fourth, in adverse capital market scenarios, the protection
provided by guaranteed IRAs is lower than anticipated. Even if the stock market dropped by
35% in workers’ last year of employment, most participants would, surprisingly, be worse off
compared to not having a guarantee. The reason is that the costs of providing the guarantee
erode the account’s asset base, relative to unprotected schemes.

5
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2.1

Riester Individual Retirement Accounts with Money-Back Guarantees
Eligibility, Incentives, and Institutional Framework
In 2018, 45 million German employees were entitled to contribute to tax-qualified Riester

IRAs, and 16.6 million people held this type of contract (BMAS, 2017). Two complementary
subsidies incentivize workers to save for retirement using such accounts.4 First, the federal
government pays a yearly subsidy into each worker’s IRA of up to €175 plus €300 per child
younger than age 25. To qualify for the full subsidy, the sum of employee contributions plus
subsidies must equal 4% of pre-tax labor income (to a cap of €2,100). If the threshold of 4% is
not met, subsidies are reduced proportionally. Subsidies on personal pension contributions are
also common in the United States, often taking the form of employer matching of contributions
up to some limit (ICI, 2021). Second, employees earning higher incomes can benefit from
deferred taxation; that is, IRA contributions to an annual cap of €2,100 are paid from pre-tax
income, and investment earnings on account assets are tax-exempt.5 In all cases, retirement
withdrawals are subject to income tax.
Approximately 65% of Riester contracts are held with life insurers, 20% with asset
managers, and 5% with banks; the dominant form is accumulation/decumulation plans of
financial assets which are the focus of this paper.6 Providers of these contracts must abide by
investment and income guarantee rules codified in the ‘Certification of Retirement Pension
Contracts Act.’ Specifically, during the decumulation phase: (i) payouts are allowed only from
age 62 onwards; (ii) not more than 30% of accumulated assets may be withdrawn as a lump
sum; (iii) the remaining assets must be distributed as lifelong non-decreasing guaranteed
nominal benefits; and (iv) mandatory annuitization is required by age 85 (at the latest) of the
retiree’s remaining capital. Usually, to fulfill the last requirement, IRA providers devote a share

4

For an overview of the government incentives to engage in Riester plans see Börsch-Supan et al. (2008).
The German tax authorities check whether the deductibility of contributions is more favorable than subsidies and
settles corresponding differences through tax refunds.
6
Banks also offer Riester IRAs in the form of special mortgage loan contracts, and they have a 10% market share.
5

6

of savers’ balances at age 67 to buy a deferred annuity paying benefits to the retiree from age
85 until death.7 In addition, product providers must offer a money-back guarantee: that is, if at
the end of the accumulation phase, the account value is lower than the sum of payments into
the IRA, the provider must cover the shortfall using its equity capital.
Following a strong initial market penetration, the number of contracts has stagnated since
2012, though it is unclear whether market saturation or declining appeal in the low interest rate
environment is the main driver. In particular, the investment and income guarantees for Riester
IRAs have become considerably more expensive since the scheme was adopted in 2002. The
main explanation for this is that the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing strategy has
caused interest rates to plummet from a historical norm of about 3%, down to the current 0%
(or even negative) nominal rate. One result is that premiums for mandatory annuitization have
become increasingly expensive. For example, the price of a deferred annuity purchased at age
67 paying lifelong benefits of €1 from age 85 onward rose from €1.59 (with an assumed interest
rate of 3%) to €2.92 (at a 0% interest rate). Another is that the low interest environment has
also led to a substantial increase in the costs of hedging the money-back guarantee.
2.2

Costs of Money-Back IRA Guarantees
To illustrate how pricing works for the money-back guarantee, we apply option pricing

techniques for a simplified IRA that omits optimal choice of annual contributions, as well as
the plan’s impact on consumption and the demand for liquid savings, following Lachance and
Mitchell (2003). In subsequent sections, we shall elaborate the model further.
We assume constant annual contributions 𝐴𝑡 (𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇) by the plan participant until
the end of the accumulation phase at time 𝑇, and the plan provider is obliged to compensate for
any losses below the sum of contributions as of date 𝑇. The put hedging approach allows the

7

This does not necessarily correspond to optimal timing of the deferred annuity purchases (Huang et al., 2016),
but it relieves the product provider from bearing some of the risk of holding equity capital to ensure non-decreasing
payouts after age 85.
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provider to offer clients participation in the stock market, while partly transferring shortfall
risks of not achieving the guaranteed amount to the capital markets. Formally, yearly
contributions 𝐴𝑡 are used to buy 𝑢𝑡 units of an equity portfolio (represented by a diversified
stock index) with price 𝑆𝑡 plus the same number of at-the-money European put options with
price 𝑃𝑡 and maturity at the end of the saving phase, i.e. 𝐴𝑡 = 𝑢𝑡 𝑆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 𝑃𝑡 . Units of the equity
portfolio are allocated to the plan participant’s IRA. If the value of the equity portfolio is lower
than the sum of contributions, the provider must pay the difference, equal to max( ∑𝑇𝑡=1 𝐴𝑡 −
∑𝑇𝑡=1 𝑢𝑡 𝑆𝑇 , 0) into the participant’s IRA; this produces an uncertain final IRA value at time 𝑇
of max( ∑𝑇𝑡=1 𝑢𝑡 𝑆𝑇 , ∑𝑇𝑡=1 𝐴𝑡 ). The put premiums charged by the provider from the participant’s
contributions are the cost of the money-back guarantee (Lachance and Mitchell, 2003).
To quantify hedging costs for plan participants, we generate 100,000 Monte Carlo
simulation paths, along with the resulting profit and loss (P&L) position of the plan provider.
We posit that the stochastic dynamics of equity investments follow a geometric Brownian
motion; moreover, consistent with the life cycle model discussed below, we assume a volatility
of 21.41% and a risk premium of 6% per year. Put option premiums are calculated using the
Black and Scholes (1973) approach under both a ‘normal’ interest rate environment (𝑖𝑓 = 3%)
and the current low interest rate scenario (𝑖𝑓 = 0%). Table 1 summarizes the guarantee costs
for plan participants, expected guarantee payouts, and the expected P&L for the plan provider,
for different time horizons and the two interest rate assumptions.
Table 1 here
Panel A of Table 1 addresses the cost of the guarantee from the participants’ perspective.
At an interest rate of 3%, guarantee costs as a share of total contributions average 9.7–11.2%,
depending on the plan’s investment horizon. At lower interest rates, guarantee costs increase
since the put options become more expensive. For instance, if the interest rate were 0% and the
horizon 42 years (coincident with the Riester pension accumulation phase), one third (35.8%)

8

of annual contributions on average would need to be devoted to put options; over a 10 year
horizon, the premiums would amount to 19% of annual contributions. Panel B indicates that, in
the 3% interest rate environment, expected guarantee payouts to the plan participant (as a
percentage of total contributions) are lowest for long plan horizons, since the portfolio value is
less likely to fall short of the guarantee amount.
For low interest rates, the larger share of contributions spent on put premiums effectively
reduces the worker’s asset base and increases guarantee payments from the provider to the
client. In all scenarios, guarantee payments are lower than the put premiums charged to the
participants. Hence in expectation, the provider might make a profit if the premiums were
charged to the client but not used to buy put options. For instance, at the longest plan horizon
of 42 years,8 guarantee costs exceed payouts by 6.6% at a 3% interest rate, and by 13.9% in the
0% interest rate scenario. Of course, such a strategy would result in substantial downside risks
to regulatory solvency capital requirements for the provider.9
Even if the provider does buy options to hedge the risk of payment obligations from the
money-back guarantee, gains and losses can still be incurred since the amount required to fulfill
the liability to compensate shortfalls in a participant’s account may deviate considerably from
the option payoffs.10 The resulting expected profit/loss appears in Panel C (again expressed in
terms of contributions). At a 3% interest rate, the provider expects to suffer losses only for short
investment horizons, and its P&L becomes more positive, the longer the investment horizon.
That is, over a plan life of 42 years, the provider earns an expected gain of 2.2% of
contributions. Conversely, at a 0% interest rate, the P&L worsens as the investment horizon

8

Options of such long maturities cannot be bought in markets, yet asset managers could buy replication portfolios.
Depending on its legal structure, a provider is required to hold regulatory solvency capital to cover possible
liabilities from the money-back guarantee: regulations vary for banks (according to the Capital Requirement
Directive), life insurers (according to the Solvency II framework, see Van Hulle, 2019), and asset managers
(according to circular 2/2007 by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority).
10
Losses occur if put payoffs do not suffice to compensate for shortfalls in client accounts, e.g. in downwardtrending markets. Gains result from volatile markets when puts bought at high stock index values in intermediate
periods pay off, while no or little compensation payments are made to clients due to a positive account
development.
9

9

lengthens, and no gains occur in expectation as initially high option premiums permit only
relatively small investments in the equity index. Thus, strikingly, in the 0% interest scenario,
even if the saving plan lasted for 42 years, losses of 7% of contributions would be expected.
It is not surprising that rising hedging costs in the low interest rate environment have
prompted those offering Riester pensions to question their ability to continue supplying the
market.11 While most savers still seem to favor guarantees,12 plan provider concerns about the
viability of the guaranteed IRA market could come to undermine the future of the funded private
pension system as a complement to the statutory pay-as-you-go old-age scheme. In what
follows, we assess whether abolishing these guarantee features could ultimately improve
savers’ financial wellbeing.

3

Money-Back IRA Guarantees in a Life Cycle Model
Evaluating how mandatory money-back guarantees in IRAs impact workers’ saving,

investment, and consumption patterns requires building and calibrating a discrete-time life
cycle model of consumption and portfolio choice. We do so by positing that the utilitymaximizing worker decides how much to consume and to invest in risky stocks, risk-free bonds,
and tax-qualified IRAs. Our framework incorporates key aspects of the German tax structure,
social security system, labor income processes, and capital market behavior.
3.1

Preferences and Optimization
We consider an individual who lives from time 𝑡 = 1 (age 25) to 𝑡 = 𝑇 = 76 (age 100)

and retires at 𝑡 = 𝐾 = 43 (age 67, the regular retirement age). Utility is measured by a timeseparable CRRA utility function with constant relative risk aversion 𝛾, defined over yearly
spending for consumption 𝐶𝑡 , and deflated by a consumer price index Π𝑡 = Π𝑡−1 (1 + 𝜋). The

11

Moreover, the German asset managers tend to be subsidiaries of major commercial banks which have also
become subject to increasingly tight equity capital requirements in the European context.
12
Union Investment (2018) reported that 88% of their IRA participants said they favored IRAs with money-back
guarantees over otherwise identical IRAs without guarantees.
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price index is assumed to evolve at a constant and deterministic rate of inflation, 𝜋, and Π0 is
normalized to one. Inflation effectively devalues the IRA’s money-back guarantee due to the
fact that it is a nominal rather than an inflation-adjusted promise. Accordingly, the model cannot
be solved entirely in real terms but instead requires explicit treatment of inflation as in Koijen
et al. (2011).13
The subjective one-period discount factor is denoted 𝛽 and the conditional survival
probability from period 𝑡 to period 𝑡 + 1 is 𝑝𝑡 . Survival probabilities are taken from the
population mortality table provided by the German Federal Statistical Office. The value
function 𝐽𝑡 depends on current realizations of the state variables: these comprise cash on hand,
𝑋𝑡𝑅 (in real terms); the value of the Riester account, 𝐼𝑅𝐴𝑡 ; the guaranteed amount (i.e. the sum
of contributions and subsidies), 𝐺𝑡 ; the annual payout of the deferred annuity after age 85, 𝐷𝑡 ;
and the labor/retirement income states, 𝑠𝑡 . Expected lifetime utility is maximized by solving
the recursive Bellman equation with respect to real consumption, 𝐶𝑡 /Π𝑡 , stock investment,
𝑆𝑡 , bond investment, 𝐵𝑡 , the IRA contribution, 𝐴𝑡 , and lump sum withdrawals 𝑊𝐿𝑆 from IRAs:
𝐽𝑡 (𝑋𝑡𝑅 , 𝐼𝑅𝐴𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡 , 𝐷𝑡 , 𝑠𝑡 ) =
(𝐶𝑡 /Π𝑡 )1−𝛾
𝑅
max
{
+ 𝛽𝑝𝑡 𝔼𝑡 [𝐽𝑡+1 (𝑋𝑡+1
, 𝐼𝑅𝐴𝑡+1 , 𝐺𝑡+1 , 𝐷𝑡+1 , 𝑠𝑡+1 )]} .
𝐶𝑡 ,𝑆𝑡 𝐵𝑡 ,𝐴𝑡 ,𝑊𝐿𝑆
1−𝛾

(1)

Presuming the common short-sale and borrowing constraints implies non-negativity of all
control variables, such that:
𝐶𝑡 , 𝑆𝑡 , 𝐵𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡 , 𝑊𝐿𝑆 ≥ 0 .

(2)

With up to five state variables (excluding time 𝑡), this model is computationally
expensive to solve. To mitigate the curse of dimensionality, we discretize the labor income
process to 𝑛𝑠 age-dependent levels; this implies that 𝑛𝑠 times as many optimization problems

13

Our model is solved in a nominal world (i.e. all income figures, tax allowances, etc. grow at the rate of inflation)
and the effect of inflation in the intertemporal tradeoff between consuming now and in the future is considered by
optimizing real consumption. Results shown in figures and tables are converted back to real terms at the end of
the subsequent simulation procedure.
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must be solved relative to a continuous income process, but we benefit from interpolating
through one fewer dimension in the computation of the value function, yielding a considerable
reduction in execution time.
Transitions between discretized income states are governed by a Markov chain,14 where
𝑞𝑠𝑡,𝑠𝑡+1 denotes the probability of migrating from a current income state 𝑠𝑡 to a subsequent
period’s state 𝑠𝑡+1 . Consequently, the expectation of the value function 𝔼𝑡 [𝐽𝑡+1 (∙)] is the
probability-weighted average of future value functions given today’s income state 𝑠𝑡 and
transition probabilities 𝑞𝑠𝑡,𝑠𝑡+1 :
𝑅
𝔼𝑡 [𝐽𝑡+1 (∙)] = ∑ 𝑞𝑠𝑡,𝑠 𝔼𝑡 [𝐽𝑡+1 (𝑋𝑡+1
, 𝐼𝑅𝐴𝑡+1 , 𝐺𝑡+1 , 𝐷𝑡+1 , 𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑠)] .

(3)

𝑠

3.2

Budget Constraints and Evolution of Cash on Hand
Prior to retirement (at 𝑡 = 𝐾 = 43), available financial resources 𝑋𝑡 are allocated across

consumption, 𝐶𝑡 , investment in stocks, 𝑆𝑡 , investment in risk-free bonds, 𝐵𝑡 , and IRA
contributions, 𝐴𝑡 . After retirement, additional IRA contributions are not possible, so the budget
constraint is:
𝑋𝑡 = {

𝐶𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐴𝑡

for 𝑡 < 𝐾

𝐶𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡

for 𝑡 ≥ 𝐾 .

(4)

Next period’s cash on hand before, at, and after retirement evolves as follows:
𝑋𝑡+1 =
𝑌𝑡 (1 − ℎ𝑡 )(1 − 𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑇 ) + 𝑆𝑡 𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝑡 𝑅𝑓 − 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝑡+1
(𝑌𝑡 (1 − ℎ𝑡 ) + 𝑊𝐿𝑆 )(1 − 𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑇 ) + 𝑆𝑡 𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝑡 𝑅𝑓 − 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝑡+1
(𝑌𝑡 (1 − ℎ𝑡 ) + 𝑊𝑡 )(1 − 𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑇 ) + 𝑆𝑡 𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝑡 𝑅𝑓 − 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝑡+1
𝑆𝑆𝑇
{(𝑌𝑡 (1 − ℎ𝑡 ) + 𝐷)(1 − 𝑐𝑡 ) + 𝑆𝑡 𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝑡 𝑅𝑓 − 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝑡+1

for 𝑡 < 𝐾
for 𝑡 = 𝐾
for 𝐾 < 𝑡 ≤ 𝐾 + 17
for 𝑡 ≥ 𝐾 + 18.

(5)

The first component of 𝑋𝑡+1 is gross income 𝑌𝑡 , either from work or from statutory
pension benefits after retirement. Gross income is reduced by federal income taxes and required
social security contributions (including unemployment insurance, health benefits, and state
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Hubener et al. (2016) use this approach to model transitions across family states.
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pensions), jointly levied as an average deduction rate 𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑇 . This formulation reflects the detailed
rules and parameters of the German social security system as well as the progressive income
tax code.15 The average deduction rate is a function of gross income and whether someone is
employed (equivalently, if time 𝑡 < 𝐾 = 43), or retired. We apply the rules and parameters as
of 2014 to generate values for 𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑇 between 10% for retirees with relatively low pension
benefits and 44% for workers with salaries above €150,000. Following Gomes and Michaelides
(2005), the resulting net income is further reduced by age-dependent housing costs, ℎ𝑡 , which
we estimate using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).16
The second component of cash on hand is the market value of last year’s investments in
stocks and bonds including returns earned, 𝑆𝑡 𝑅𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝑡 𝑅𝑓 , less taxes on capital gains 𝐶𝐺𝑇𝑡+1 .
𝑅𝑡+1 is the gross return on stocks which is assumed to be log-normally distributed, and 𝑅𝑓 is
the risk-free return on bonds. Investment income from stocks and bonds is tax-exempt up to an
annual limit of €801; in excess of this amount, a rate of 26.375% applies. After retirement, cash
on hand includes lump sum withdrawals 𝑊𝐿𝑆 (at age 67), withdrawals 𝑊𝑡 (from age 68 until
84) and constant nominal annuity payouts 𝐷 from the IRA (from age 85 onward), reduced by
income taxes and contributions to health insurance.
In addition, each individual is posited to start the worklife with a given level of initial
wealth, which we assume coincides with the worker’s first simulated income level. Levels of
starting wealth are estimated from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Panel on Household Finances
(PHF) for individuals age 23–27.17 In calibrating capital market parameters, we use postGerman reunification data from June 1991 to December 2015; all calculations are carried out
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Online Appendix A provides additional detail on the German social security and income tax system.
Additional details are provided in Online Appendix B. Property is the largest component of German household
wealth (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2016), yet its purchase is generally accompanied by significant debt financing,
violating our non-negativity assumption on asset holdings. For this reason we do not integrate housing decisions
in the model and implicitly treat everyone as tenants. Panel A of Online Appendix B reports our estimated rental
costs as a percentage of net income for the German population (estimated using SOEP).
17
The values of starting wealth are {€0; €140; €515; €1,250; €2,300; €3,980; €7,300; €12,300; €17,180; €40,300}.
16
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on a monthly basis and then annualized. All-item consumer prices are taken from Datastream;
interest rate data refer to 1-year German government zerobonds taken from Deutsche
Bundesbank; and equity data are from Datastream and refer to the largest German stock index,
DAX 30.
For our ‘base case’ in the analysis below, we use sample means for all variables reflecting
what had traditionally been seen as a ‘normal’ capital market environment. Specifically, the
annual inflation rate 𝜋 is estimated at 1.75%, close to the European Central Bank’s (2018)
inflation target of ‘below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.’ Mean nominal returns on
government bonds 𝑖𝑓 are set at 3%. The equity risk premium of the stock index is 6.83% with
a volatility of 21.41%; we downward-adjust the excess return to 6% in order to reflect
management fees and trading costs. Both estimates are consistent with international and
German historical risk premiums, as documented by Jordà et al. (2019).
3.3

Labor Earnings and Retirement Income
To model labor income, most life cycle studies adapt the methodology of Carroll and

Samwick (1997), where earnings are a function of a deterministic trend component as well as
permanent and transitory shocks (e.g. Cocco et al., 2005; Fagereng et al., 2017). By contrast,
Fehr and Habermann (2008) discretized the labor income process to six levels (which they term
productivity levels) with the transition path between the levels governed by a Markov transition
matrix. In what follows, we combine both approaches, such that employees can migrate across
𝑛𝑠 = 10 income levels 𝑓𝑡,𝑠 (𝑠 = 1, … , 10); we also add a transitory shock log-normally
2
2
distributed as ln(𝑈𝑡,𝑠 ) ~𝑁(−0.5𝜎u,s
, 𝜎u,s
). This approach retains the essence of Carroll and

Samwick’s (1997) method while being computationally less burdensome. Consequently, during
the worklife (𝑡 < 𝐾), labor income 𝑌𝑡 is the product of the age and state-dependent income level
𝑓𝑡,𝑠 and the transitory shock 𝑈𝑡,𝑠 such that:
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𝑌𝑡,𝑠 = 𝑓𝑡,𝑠 𝑈𝑡,𝑠 .

(6)

We calibrate the labor income process based on SOEP data.18 After retirement at age 67,
individuals in our model receive constant (real) lifelong benefits from the statutory pension
system. These benefits are based on individual labor earnings (up to a ceiling) relative to
population average labor income each year during the worklife. Given 2014 values for the
contribution ceiling (of €71,400) and mean income (of €34,514), an annual maximum of
71,400
34,514

= 2.0687 pension points can be earned. The sum of pension points earned is then

multiplied by a ‘pension value factor’ (of €343.3) to determine annual pension income.19
3.4

Structure of the Riester IRA
Each period during the worklife, the employee decides on the amount contributed to the

IRA, 𝐴𝑡 . In addition, the government contributes an amount 𝑏𝑡 that includes the basic subsidy
of up to €175, plus subsidies of up to €300 per child. In the model, we treat the number of
children as deterministic and estimate the count of dependents using SOEP data.20 Two
requirements must be fulfilled to be eligible to receive the maximum possible subsidy of
𝑏 𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 175 + 300 ⋅ 𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛 . First, the worker must pay in at least €60 of own contributions
to receive any IRA subsidy at all, i.e. 𝐴𝑡 ≥ 60. Second, the sum of the worker’s own
contribution 𝐴𝑡 plus the government’s subsidy 𝑏𝑡 must equal the lesser of 4% of last year’s
annual gross income 𝑌𝑡−1 or €2,100 (formally, 𝐴𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡 ≥ min(0.04 ∙ 𝑌𝑡−1 , 2100)). Lower IRA
payments proportionally reduce the subsidies. Consequently, the fraction (0 ≤ 𝛼𝑡 ≤ 1) of the
maximum attainable subsidy granted is given by (𝐴𝑡 ≥ 60):

18

For details on the estimation and results see Online Appendix C.
We use the same number of 𝑛𝑠 retirement income levels as for labor income, but once the pension state has been
set, it remains indefinitely. Numerical values of each level’s mean pension points and benefits (and boundaries
between levels) are derived by simulating the income process prior to the optimization.
20
Receipt of Riester child subsidies is contingent on entitlement to governmental child-care allowances, not
reported in the SOEP. Instead we use the number of children living with parents as a proxy. Panel B of Online
Appendix B reports our estimated numbers of children by age in the population.
19
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𝛼𝑡 = max (

𝐴𝑡
, 1)
min(0.04 ∙ 𝑌𝑡−1 , 2100) − 𝑏 𝑚𝑎𝑥

(7)

and the resulting subsidy paid into the IRA is:
𝑏𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 ⋅ 𝑏 𝑚𝑎𝑥 .

(8)

During the worklife, our model assumes that IRA assets are fully invested in stocks, and
the product provider purchases at-the-money put options to hedge the money-back guarantee.
Put premiums 𝑃𝑡 are directly charged from contributions, determined using the Black and
Scholes (1973) formula. In addition, front-end loads may be paid out of contributions, but in
our base case analysis, we set fees 𝜁 to 0%. Consistent with Gomes et al. (2009) our model rules
out the possibility of withdrawals from the IRA before retirement due to high penalties which
render this option unattractive.21
IRA contributions cease at the age of 66 (𝑡 = 𝐾 − 1 = 42). If the plan balance at that
time has fallen below the worker’s lifetime sum of contributions and government subsidies, the
product provider must top up the account by paying the difference Υ = max(∑𝐾−1
𝑡=1 (𝐴𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡 ) −
𝐼𝑅𝐴𝐾 , 0). Subsequently, the saver may elect to withdraw up to 30% of the IRA value as a lump
sum, 𝑊𝐿𝑆 . From the remaining balance, an assumed share of 20% is spent to purchase a deferred
annuity that provides lifelong, nominally-fixed benefits of 𝐷 from age 85 onward. In pricing
the deferred life annuity, we assume the discount rate corresponds to the assumed bond return;
we also apply a population mortality table and add a markup of 12.5% to the respective annuity
factor to reflect average loadings observed in the German private annuity market (Kaschützke
and Maurer, 2011).22

21

Early withdrawals of any amount trigger an immediate repayment of all granted subsidies and tax allowances.
Given the average government grant of 38.2% per contribution (BMF, 2019) we assume that early withdrawals
are largely unattractive (as especially liquidity constrained low earners receive the highest grant rates).
Technically, allowing for early withdrawals would require to also track the sum of received tax allowances, what
would cost an additional state variable. Penalty-free early withdrawals are feasible to purchase or construct owneroccupied property, yet housing decisions are beyond the scope of the model.
22
The European Union Directive 2004/113/EC provides that men and women must be treated equally when
calculating insurance premiums, so we compute annuity prices based on a unisex mortality table.
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Annual withdrawals of IRA assets from age 68 (𝑡 = 𝐾 + 1) until age 84 (𝑡 = 𝐾 + 17)
𝐼𝑅𝐴

𝑡
are governed by the formula 𝑊𝑡 = 85−𝑎𝑔𝑒
, which implies that an increasing fraction of the
𝑡

remaining balance is withdrawn and full depletion of the account occurs at age 84. The
government also requires that benefits during the payout phase may not decrease. Since the
provider must make up shortfalls with its equity capital, the portfolio allocation is shifted to a
mix of 20% equity and 80% bonds during the payout phase. Therefore, the evolution of the IRA
balance is given by:
𝐼𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 ⋅ 𝑅𝑡 + (𝐴𝑡 + 𝑏𝑡 )(1 − 𝜁) − 𝑃𝑡
(𝐼𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑅𝑡 + Υ) ∙ 0.8 − 𝑊𝐿𝑆
𝐼𝑅𝐴𝑡 =
𝐼𝑅𝐴𝑡−1 ∙ (0.2 ∙ 𝑅𝑡 + 0.8 ∙ 𝑅𝑓 ) − 𝑊𝑡
{0
3.5

for
for
for
for

𝑡<𝐾
𝑡=𝐾
𝐾 < 𝑡 ≤ 𝐾 + 17
𝑡 > 𝐾 + 17.

(9)

Calibration and Numerical Solution
We use dynamic stochastic programming to recursively solve the individual’s

optimization problem by backward induction. Derived policies govern how to behave optimally
so as to maximize the present value of utility from today’s and future consumption. During
retirement, for all specifications, the model includes four state variables: cash on hand (𝑋𝑡 ), the
IRA balance (𝐼𝑅𝐴𝑡 ), payouts from the deferred annuity (𝐷), and the retirement income state
(𝑠). The state space is discretized using a 30(𝑋)×20(𝐼𝑅𝐴)×10(𝐷)×10(𝑠) grid size with equal
spacing in the natural logarithm (measured in €1,000) for the three continuous state variables
(𝑋, 𝐼𝑅𝐴, 𝐷). During the worklife and with the IRA investment guarantee, the state of the
deferred annuity is replaced by an equal number of grid points tracking the sum of guaranteed
contributions and subsidies (𝐺𝑡 ), leaving the number of optimizations per time step unaltered at
60,000. In the absence of a guarantee, this state can be saved which decreases the problem size
by a factor of 10. For each grid point, we calculate the optimal policies and value functions
𝔼𝑡 [𝐽𝑡+1 (∙)] using Gauss-Hermite quadrature integration and cubic spline interpolation. In the
subsequent simulation, 100,000 independent life cycles are generated using optimal feedback
controls.
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In a matching procedure closely related to Love (2010), we select preference parameters
such that the model generates average asset holdings consistent with empirical evidence derived
from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s PHF. Specifically, the discount factor 𝛽 and the coefficient
of relative risk aversion 𝛾 are chosen in model calibration such that the sum of relative squared
differences between average model wealth and the empirical data is minimized using five-year
age groups. The best fit is achieved with a discount factor of 𝛽 = 0.93 and relative risk aversion
of 𝛾 = 7.23

4

Results
Next we illustrate the implications of switching from the money-back guaranteed IRA to

an otherwise identical retirement account without the guarantee. In particular, we show how
eliminating the guarantee in the above model alters a utility-maximizing individual’s optimal
contributions to the IRA during the worklife, IRA payouts during retirement, liquid asset
holdings, and consumption opportunities over the life cycle. Our base case calibration assumes
a nominal risk-free rate of 3% and an inflation rate of 1.75%, while the alternative low return
scenario posits a 0% interest and inflation rate. These alternatives highlight the protective role
of the guarantee as well as its negative consequences for consumption.
Figure 1 shows how pre-tax earnings, liquid asset holdings (stock and bonds), IRA
contributions, balances, and payouts evolve, along with optimal non-housing consumption24 for
a money-back guarantee IRA (Panel A) versus an IRA without a guarantee (Panel B) in the
base case.25 In both scenarios, consumption is slightly hump-shaped. Rising consumption
during the first decade of the worklife results from the well-known effect of constrained
borrowing given rising labor income (Chai et al., 2011). Falling consumption during retirement

23

A description of the methodology and visualizations of model-generated and empirical data for the eight age
groups appear in Online Appendix D.
24
In the following, we use the terms ‘non-housing consumption’ and ‘consumption’ interchangeably.
25
All values are expressed in €2015.
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is mainly driven by the interaction of a relatively low subjective discount factor and rising
mortality probabilities that reduces the demand for consumption smoothing. It is notable that
consumption during the worklife is significantly below pre-tax labor income, mainly due to
income taxes, social security contributions, housing costs, and to a lesser extent, savings. For
example, at age 50, labor income peaks and workers earn, on average, about €39,600. Out of
that income, €14,550 is spent on social security, income taxes, and capital gains taxes; €7,850
on housing expenses; €16,350 on consumption; and only €850 is devoted to savings, mostly
using tax-qualified IRAs.
Figure 1 here
Panel A of Figure 1 shows that, with a guarantee at age 67, the IRA is reduced by about
€38,300, to €75,400. This is because, first, the product provider expends 20% (€22,400) of the
account balance to purchase an annuity with benefits being deferred until age 85. Second, the
retiree withdraws about €15,900 (or 14.5%) of the IRA balance as a lump sum at that point.
This is well below the allowed maximum of 30%, enabling the retiree to enjoy higher
withdrawals later in life. Of this lump sum payout, about one third (35%) goes to income taxes,
and another 50% is used to support consumption. The remaining 15% is shifted into nonqualified liquid assets which offer greater flexibility in asset allocation and timing of cash flows
than the IRA.
At age 68, the saver’s income consists of €15,450 from the social insurance system,
€4,550 from the IRA withdrawal plan, and she sells €5,050 of stocks and bonds. After taxes
and social security payments, €3,950 is spent on housing and €16,200 on non-housing
consumption. Of these expenses, 60% are covered by public pension benefits, 18% from IRA
payouts, and 22% from liquidating stock and bond holdings. In later periods, consumption
smoothing allows the individual to reduce the sale of stocks and bonds when expected payouts
from the IRA increase. At age 85, her IRA payouts consist only of constant nominal annuity
payments. By then, the share of income from the social insurance program has risen to 67%,
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IRA annuity payouts to 27%, and stock and bond sales only amount to 6%. After age 85,
consumption decreases because annuity payouts are devalued by inflation and liquid assets have
fallen to levels inadequate to maintain previous consumption levels (e.g. at age 85 stock and
bond sales amount to only €500).
Next we compare consumption, income, and asset holding patterns for the no guarantee
case, depicted in Panel B. While most of the results are similar, one difference is the 11% higher
average IRA balance of €125,600 without the guarantee at retirement, versus €113,650 with the
guarantee. Greater IRA saving results partly from lower liquid savings: by retirement, these are
crowded out by about 7.2% (to only €34,200).26 Additionally, a higher share of consumption is
financed by IRA distributions without the guarantee, versus with it (21% vs. 18% at age 67,
41% vs. 27% at age 85).
Differences in IRA balances may be attributed to paying hedging costs with a moneyback guarantee, as well as to differences in contributions across the two scenarios. Figure 2
provides a more detailed picture of optimal IRA contribution patterns over the life cycle, again
with and without investment guarantees. Panel A shows the share of individuals with positive
contributions to the IRA, where results are similar under the two scenarios. Starting from low
figures in the range of 20% to 25%, the participation rate gradually rises to 60% at age 40, and
then it flattens out. The lower participation rate by young workers is driven by relatively low
(but rising) labor incomes and households’ need to build up precautionary liquid savings before
engaging in illiquid retirement saving. Panel B depicts average IRA contribution rates
(including subsidies) as share of gross income, conditional on participation. Here contribution
rates are hump-shaped, rising from 2.5–3.0% in the twenties to a peak of 4% at age 49, falling

26

The first two columns of Table 5 summarize the data for the total population and IRAs with (without) moneyback guarantee. A breakdown by income classes is provided in Table 2.
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thereafter to 1.8–2.6% after age 60. The model-determined falling contribution rates in later life
are due to the fact that the appeal of tax deferral declines as retirement approaches.27
Figure 2 here
Beyond age 55, Panel B of Figure 2 shows that participation and contribution rates are
systematically higher without the guarantee. Two factors drive this result. First, for the
guaranteed IRA, the cost of purchasing put options becomes more relevant with less time to
maturity, leading people to optimally reduce contributions as they near retirement. Second, IRA
participants without the guarantee who experience unfavorable returns late in their work lives
will optimally increase contributions to offset losses. Ultimately, different guarantee costs and
payouts, IRA contributions and withdrawals, and portfolio allocations, jointly translate into
consumption differences.
For our base calibration, the fan chart in the top panel of Figure 3 depicts path-wise
percentage consumption differences without versus with the guarantee, where the IRA with a
guarantee is the reference. The turquoise line in the top panel depicts the mean consumption
difference, while the blue surface illustrates the 5th to 95th percentile with shading being
proportional to the distribution mass. The bottom panel reports the share of people having
higher consumption in the absence of a guarantee. Overall, mean consumption differences are
positive in all periods (except the first), and the dispersion increases with age. Until age 50,
consumption is virtually the same with or without the IRA money-back guarantee. In
retirement, higher account balances in the no guarantee case result in larger plan withdrawals
and annuity payouts that improve old-age consumption considerably. Importantly, consumption
is enhanced most when it is at its lowest levels, and the marginal utility of consumption is
highest. Put differently, eliminating the guarantee reduces the impact of longevity risk most,

27

The hump-shaped contribution pattern generated by our model is largely in line with actual contribution patterns
reported by Dolls et al. (2018), though they show contributions peaking about five years earlier.
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just when unanticipated spending needs might not be met due to low levels of liquid assets and
binding borrowing constraints.
Figure 3 here
The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows that most people would be advantaged if their
retirement accounts had no guarantee. By retirement age, for instance, three-quarters of all
individuals would be better off without the IRA guarantee, and by the end of their lives, this
percentage rises to 91%. This is because higher withdrawals improve consumption
opportunities, and larger annuity payouts supplement social insurance program benefits after
liquid assets are depleted. The bottom panel shows only the frequency of individuals who have
higher consumption without the IRA guarantee, while the shaded areas in the top panel quantify
the magnitudes of the changes. Overall, the distribution around the turquoise mean line is fairly
symmetric, implying that even those who are protected by the guarantee benefit relatively little.
For instance, the largest protection offered by the guarantee occurs at age 67, when consumption
with a guarantee on the 5th percentile would be 3.2% higher for those with poor capital market
experiences. At the same age, those with positive capital market experiences at the 95th
percentile could boost their consumption by over 4.8%, if the IRA had no guarantee. Until the
terminal period, the level of protection provided tends to decrease, while excess consumption
rises from abolishing the guarantee. For instance, at age 95, those in the 5th percentile who have
the guarantee only receive 1.6% more consumption. Conversely, those at the 95th percentile
would expect 9.8% higher consumption if the IRA had no guarantee. In other words, the upside
exceeds the downside in terms of consumption from switching to an IRA regime without a
guarantee.
Table 2 examines whether the implications of switching to a non-guaranteed IRA differ
by workers’ income group. In our base calibration, Panels A to D report consumption, liquid
savings, IRA balances, and payouts (in €1,000) for the bottom, middle, and top 10% of lifetime
income observations. Panel E quantifies the share of retiree consumption and housing costs that
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can be financed by IRA payouts, while Panel F reports the frequency of simulated life cycles
in which the IRA balance at retirement falls short of the guaranteed amount (both in %). The
columns labeled ‘With’ show average amounts by age groups for the IRA regime including a
money-back guarantee; the columns labeled ‘Without’ report results for a no-guarantee regime.
Results are presented as a percentage of the respective guarantee counterfactual.
Table 2 here
A key lesson from Panel A is that average consumption is similar in the early years, but
without a guarantee, consumption for all three income groups increases monotonically, rising
to an annual 2–4% more for the no-guarantee IRA over the last 20 years of life. These
improvements are larger in percentage terms for top and middle income earners who can afford
higher IRA contributions, yet a 3% improvement for low income earners is still important given
their high marginal utility of consumption. We also find that IRAs without guarantees crowd
out liquid savings (see Panel B). The reason is that higher average IRA payouts in retirement
permit an individual to draw down liquid savings earlier, because the higher annuity payouts
are sufficient to reduce longevity risk. This reduction in liquid assets is most notable for middle
and low earners, both of whom reduce their liquid savings by 8–10% from age 60 to 79. By
contrast, workers earning the highest incomes reduce their liquid assets by only 3%. This
complements the result in Panel C that IRA balances are higher for all income groups without
the guarantee, and those with low earnings boost their IRA balances the most.
Another finding is that the higher level of IRA assets accrued by low income earners age
60–79 is +22%, without versus with a guarantee; top 10% earners accumulate only +9% more.
As shown in Panel E of Table 2, the relative importance of IRA savings to fund old-age
consumption for wealthier individuals exceeds that of the less wealthy. Hence the impact of
potential losses from adverse capital market returns on consumption is much greater for higher
paid workers. Accordingly, lower earners benefit more from a non-money-back IRA, compared
to the high income earners.
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Panel D summarizes the IRA payouts which mirror results in prior Panels. For the top
(middle) earners, non-guaranteed IRA payouts are 9% (11%) higher than with guarantees; for
low earners, IRA payouts rise by 21–22%. This large improvement for the lowest earners
provides only a 2–3% total consumption increase, as their IRA balances and liquid assets are
still low.28 Panel F quantifies the downside risk of switching from a guaranteed to a nonguaranteed IRA regime for each of the three income groups. By construction, for scenarios with
money-back guarantees, there is no shortfall risk (defined as having an IRA balance at
retirement below the sum of contributions and subsidies). Even without a guarantee, the
shortfall probability for high and middle income earners is moderate, at 3.9% and 5.7%,
respectively. Yet for low earners, the shortfall probability is much higher, at 11.5%. This
difference can be attributed to the fact that low income earners tend to contribute considerably
later, around age 57.8, versus age 49,1 for high and 51.1 for middle income earners. Forgoing
early contributions implies that the low earners build only a small cushion against adverse
capital market developments, and therefore they are more vulnerable to losses later in life.
Though low earners experience the least additional consumption and are exposed to the
increase in shortfall risk without guarantees, Table 3 reveals that the proportion of these
individuals better off without the guarantee is the largest: from ages 60–79, 72% are better off,
and 89% between the ages of 80–100. The proportions are similar for middle earners, at 75%
and 88%, respectively. Among the highest earners, the majority is better off: 68% (81%) of this
group enjoys more consumption between ages 60–79 (ages 80–100).
Table 3 here
It is also of interest to compare IRA participation rates, which we do in Table 4. Here we
see that, for all income and age groups, the share of workers contributing to an IRA is at least
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Bonin (2009) and Börsch-Supan et al. (2008) note that low income households may find it unattractive to save
in pension products due to high current consumption utility, and tax incentives tend to be weaker than for their
wealthier counterparts.
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as high without as with a guarantee. Nevertheless, high earners follow a hump-shaped
participation pattern over their life cycles. Middle income earners trace out a flat trajectory, and
participation for low earners is low during their early and middle years and rises only near
retirement.
Table 4 here
The first two columns of Table 5 provide the same information as Table 2, but now we
average results over the entire population instead of by income subgroups. Results for a real
guarantee (columns 3 and 6) are discussed below, in the robustness check section. Columns 4
and 5 at the aggregate level show results for the alternative capital market environment with
interest and inflation rates of 0%. Here it is clear that the negative implications of the mandatory
money-back guarantee are amplified, which we ascribe to the disproportionately higher costs
of providing the guarantee. Table 5 also reveals that IRA balances (Panel C) and payouts (Panel
D) during retirement plummet by around two-thirds (63–67%) under the zero interest rate
regime. By contrast, liquid savings rise by over 45% as of the retirement date (Panel B).
Nevertheless, the higher liquid savings are insufficient to fully compensate for lower IRA
payouts, so old-age consumption (Panel A) falls in the low return scenario by around 9%
compared to the historically ‘normal’ environment. Importantly, the relative advantage of
abolishing the guarantee in terms of old-age consumption rises substantially from 3% to 11%
of retiree consumption, versus the normal capital market scenario. In other words, eliminating
the money-back guarantee would substantially benefit retirees in the current low return
environment.
Table 5 here
Figure 4 provides insights into the heterogeneous changes in contributions and retiree
consumption by average annual income, without versus with the guarantee. The x-axis shows
average yearly lifetime labor income, while the y-axis displays the change in IRA contributions
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(including subsidies, expressed as percent of lifetime labor income) if the IRA’s investment
guarantee were eliminated. Each of the 100,000 circles indicates how much individuals would
gain or lose from abolishing the money-back guarantee. Green (purple) circles depict increases
(decreases) in average yearly retirement consumption, and darker color circles reflect larger
changes (white circles indicate small or zero changes).
Figure 4 here
For the base case calibration with historically normal interest and inflation rates, Panel A
indicates that most participants (about 71.5%) increase their contributions without the
guarantee. Moreover, the dispersion in contribution changes is wider for high versus low
earners. Consistent with the bottom Panel of Figure 3, green circles dominate, so most retirees
enjoy greater consumption without the guarantee. Those benefitting from elimination of the
guarantee also boost their contributions, except for some low income workers whose anticipated
consumption rises so they therefore can cut back on contributions. The circle colors indicate
that those who neither gain nor lose from the IRA guarantee status predominate among workers
who cut their contributions. Importantly, while average retiree consumption is unaffected,
eliminating the guarantee still leaves workers with higher consumption during the accumulation
phase. Moreover, those experiencing reduced old-age consumption are mainly high-income
earners. As shown in Table 2, the relative importance of IRA savings to fund old-age
consumption for wealthier individuals exceeds that of the less wealthy. Consequently, without
the IRA money-back guarantee, the wealthy become more vulnerable to negative capital market
experiences late in life, compared to their less wealthy counterparts.
Panel B of Figure 4 emphasizes that, in the low return environment, the IRA guarantee
has two offsetting impacts. On the one hand, retiree consumption rises most without the
guarantee – by an average of 6.7% – indicated by dark green circles which clearly outnumber
the dark purple circles. On the other hand, more participants enjoy significant protection from
a guarantee when a low return environment prevails.
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In the low return environment, several important differences should be noted. First, most
participants who benefit from abolishing the guarantee (green circles) cut their lifetime
contributions. Of those, a second clustering of low income earners can be observed; for them,
the vast majority enjoys significant consumption improvements. There is even more
heterogeneity in consumption at the top of the income distribution. Again, this can be attributed
to the higher earner’s greater exposure to poor capital market shocks toward the end of the
accumulation period. The clustering of high income earners having large consumption losses
and making higher contributions (top right of Panel B) are those who experienced large IRA
losses in the decade prior to retirement. To regain IRA wealth sufficient to support old-age
consumption, their contributions rise sharply to about 5% of income (about 2.5 times the
population average).
Overall, this Section has shown that eliminating the IRA guarantee enhances average
consumption opportunities for savers, particularly for middle and higher earners, because the
guarantee costs outweigh the benefits of downside protection. Moreover, people save more in
their non-guaranteed IRAs compared to the guaranteed IRA, allowing them to reduce their
liquid stock and bond holdings. This conclusion is sharpened in a low return/inflation scenario,
though more people will suffer losses when not covered by the IRA guarantee. Since significant
losses can occur for savers without a guarantee, this raises the question as to whether a life cycle
investment strategy such as a target date fund might be an attractive alternative. We examine
this option below.

5

Robustness Checks
Having investigated the economic implications of a money-back nominal IRA guarantee

on plan participant behavior, we next confirm that an inflation-protected guarantee would
amplify the concerns already raised for nominal guarantees. And importantly, we show that a
life cycle or target date strategy with insufficient equity exposure can be even less attractive
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than a money-back IRA guarantee. Finally, even for scenarios when equity market crashes
happen during the last working period, we find that plans without a guarantee perform
surprisingly well.29,30
5.1

Real Guarantees
Thus far, we have taken as given the regulation requiring a nominal money-back

guarantee at the end of the accumulation phase. Nevertheless, some authors have explored
inflation protection over the guarantee contract’s term.31 The appeal of a real guarantee is that
it preserves savers’ purchasing power, though it requires higher costs and therefore can erode
account balances over time. For instance, Pennacchi (1999) and Fischer (1999) discussed the
Latin American pension market where real guarantees were promised during times of high
inflation: there the guarantees were usually not market-based (replicated by combining
tradeable assets) but instead were provided by governments.
To illustrate how an inflation-protected guarantee might work in our context, we replace
the nominal with a real money-back guarantee.32 To this end, instead of buying at-the-money
put options with the contributions, in-the-money put options must be purchased with strike
prices accounting for inflation accruing until retirement. Results for the base calibration in
Column 3 of Table 5 support our conjecture that real guarantees erode consumption even more
than nominal guarantees.33
Table 5 here
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In Online Appendix E we demonstrate that our results are also robust to using Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences,
and that demand for the IRA is only moderately affected by introduction of common front-end loads 𝜁 of 5% on
IRA contributions.
30
In Online Appendix F we show that the conclusions are not a result of uniquely German circumstances, but that
they also hold for a more generalized IRA setup.
31
For instance, Feldstein and Samwick (2002) and Feldstein (2009) considered real guarantees for investmentbased Social Security reforms in the U.S.
32
We keep the annuity payouts as nominal to maintain consistency with previous analyses.
33
For the zero inflation scenario in Column 6 of Table 5, results correspond to those of the nominal guarantee in
Column 4.
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Specifically, old-age consumption under a real guarantee falls short of the nominal
guarantee scheme by 2 to 6% on average (Panel A). The average timing and the sum of
contributions is very similar across guarantee designs, so the approximately 16% decline in
account balances and payouts may be directly attributed to higher guarantee costs (Panels C
and D). To compensate for lower IRA payouts under a real guarantee, liquid saving increases
beyond the levels in the other two cases. Our analysis shows that a real guarantee compounds
the negative effects of nominal guarantees.
5.2

Life Cycle Target Date Funds
Some might argue that life cycle or target date funds could constitute a viable alternative

to money-back guarantees as a risk mitigation technique. This type of investment approach
follows an age-based allocation rule, starting with higher equity shares early in life, and
gradually rebalancing along a glide path to less risky securities (such as bonds) near and into
retirement (Vanguard, 2017). In the U.S., much of the $5 trillion invested in 401(k) defined
contribution retirement plans is automatically defaulted into target date investment strategies.34
The regulatory environment for the European Union’s Basic PEPP also allows providers to use
a life cycle strategy, under the presumption that it is ‘consistent with the objective of allowing
the PEPP saver to recoup the capital’ instead of requiring a money-back guarantee (see EU
2019/1238 (54) and Art. 46).
While there are many variants of life cycle strategies in the market, two general
approaches are common.35 One starts investors at a relatively high equity exposure and reduces
this share annually using a moderate adjustment factor. For example, Malkiel (1996) postulated
that the percentage of IRA assets invested in equities should follow a ‘100 - age’ rule. A second
approach retains a high equity exposure during much of the accumulation period, but imposes

34

The U.S. legislative framework has encouraged this practice, with the 2006 Pension Protection Act permitting
plan sponsors to include target date funds as ‘qualified default investment alternatives’.
35
For an overview, see Poterba et al. (2006) and Berardi et al. (2018). Gomes et al. (2020b) showed that target
date fund returns can be improved by following simple heuristics that exploit stock market predictability.
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a stronger de-risking pattern near retirement. Cocco et al. (2005) proposed reducing the 100%
equity exposure from age 41 onwards by 2.5 percentage points per year until retirement
(hereafter referred to as ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule), which is largely consistent with flat equity
shares until age 40 that decrease almost linearly to about 40% before retirement common in
U.S. target date funds (van Bilsen et al., 2020). Using a simulation approach, Berardi et al.
(2018) studied a range of other life cycle approaches, finding that the value of contributions can
be preserved with over 99% probability given an intermediate investment horizon of 40 years;
with a 95% probability, the final account balance is likely to be worth at least 1.8 times the sum
of contributions. While these results suggest that a life cycle approach could be appealing from
a shortfall perspective, it has not yet been demonstrated whether decreasing the risky share is
preferable to a money-back guarantee.
Accordingly, we extend our analyses by introducing the two life cycle approaches
sketched above, where the IRA’s equity share during the participant’s worklife is set either
using a ‘100 - age’ rule, or a ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule. The remainder of the portfolio is then
invested in risk-free bonds. To maintain consistency with the previous setup, we assume that
the IRA switches to a 20% equity exposure after retirement. Results appear in Tables 6 and 7,
for the base ‘normal’ case, as well as the low interest rate and inflation scenario.
Tables 6 and 7 here
For the 3% nominal interest base case, Panel A of Table 6 depicts old-age consumption
when the IRA invests in a ‘100 minus age’ life cycle fund; this proves to be some 5–15% below
that achieved in the guarantee case. Panel A of Table 7 indicates that, during retirement, twothirds of plan participants can consume more if they have a guaranteed IRA compared to the
more conservative life cycle fund. This is because people accumulate about one-third less in
their IRAs with the conservative life cycle fund, compared to the guarantee case (Panel C, Table
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6).36 As a result, also the share of consumption financed by IRA payouts is 7–10 percentage
points lower than that resulting from a 100% equity exposure with a money-back guarantee.
This highlights the fact that the life cycle glide path reduces the equity share too quickly
during the accumulation phase so asset accumulation is hampered – even with higher
contributions – and less capital can be withdrawn during the payout phase (Panel D, Table 6).
Although this disadvantage is partly mitigated by the alternative life cycle rule (‘100-until-40,
-2.5’), it is not eliminated. Panel F of Table 6 confirms Berardi et al.’s (2018) finding that, in a
normal capital market scenario, shortfalls are rare when the IRA is invested in a life cycle fund,
occurring in only 0.9% (1.3%) of the cases for the ‘100 minus age’ rule (‘100-until-40, -2.5‘
rule) versus the 6.4% shortfall probability without a guarantee.37
Next we explore how results differ in a less propitious capital market environment. As
noted above, costs for money-back guarantees become more expensive, due to higher put
premiums. Also the larger share of bonds in the life cycle strategy produces lower returns.
Compared to the IRA guarantee case, expected old-age consumption in Table 6 with the
conservative (‘100 minus age’) target date fund falls short by only 1–2% (Panel A), and the
share of consumption (including housing) financed by IRA payouts is only 0.5–0.8 percentage
points lower (Panel E). Panel B of Table 7 shows that less than half (43–44%) of retirees
anticipate consuming more with the life cycle fund in their IRAs, yet the shortfall probability
(Panel F of Table 6) increases substantially to 18.7%.
By contrast, in the zero interest rate scenario, the ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ fund holding more
equity can partly overcome the burden of a high bond allocation during the accumulation phase.
Compared to the money-back IRA, this more aggressive life cycle approach provides 1–2%

36

Interestingly, the lower IRA balances are not driven by lower contributions: in fact, the sum of contributions is
the highest for the ‘100 minus age’ life cycle fund case, averaging €27,300, followed by the no guarantee case
(€23,150), and the guarantee case last (€22,400).
37
We note, however, that Berardi et al. (2018) have a money-weighted timing of contributions in the middle of
the accumulation phase, while in our case it is about five years later (after 26.2 years); ours provides less time for
compounding. Moreover, around half of their bond investments consist of credit-risky bonds, enabling their
portfolios to benefit from a risk premium.
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more old-age consumption (Panel A, Table 6). Moreover about 55% of retirees can expect to
consume more (Panel B, Table 7), and the share of expenditures in old-age financed by IRA
payouts increases by 1.2–1.8 percentage points (Panel E, Table 6). Nevertheless, the shortfall
probability is high, at 17.6%, a value inconsistent with the EU regulatory objective of
‘recouping the capital’ of the PEPP saver.
5.3

Resilience to Capital Market Crashes
The purpose of guarantees in IRAs is to offer downside protection against adverse capital

market developments, although as we have shown, this comes at the cost of lower average
payouts. Indeed, our results above suggest that guarantees do harm consumption and downside
protection appears surprisingly small. Nevertheless, since savers choosing guaranteed IRAs
seem to value the promised protection, next we quantify how well such IRAs might perform if
a severe shock hit the equity market in the terminal period of the accumulation phase. In
particular, we examine a scenario where the equity market unexpectedly plummets by 35% just
before retirement.38
The histograms in Figure 5 report a metric we term the distance to guarantee payoff for
an IRA having a guarantee, compared to alternative risk-mitigation techniques. This metric
quantifies how big the equity return in the last work period would need to be, such that at
retirement the IRA balance exactly matched the sum of contributions and subsidies (the
guarantee amount).
Figure 5 here
For the low interest rate scenario, in the left Panel, the light (dark) bars show the
frequency distribution of the distance to guarantee payoff for an IRA with (without) a moneyback guarantee. This is measured one year from retirement in all cases. The vertical line splits

38

This equity market crash roughly corresponds to the decline of the German DAX index after the outbreak of the
coronavirus in early 2020, which in the European context, was the first equity market crash in the era of zero or
negative nominal interest rates. This also corresponds to the 4.4% quantile of the distribution of 12-month rolling
returns of the index since 06/1990.

32

the data into accounts in surplus over the guarantee amount (left of the line), and those in deficit
(right of the line). With a guarantee, 46.2% of the guaranteed IRA balances fall short one year
before retirement, whereas without a guarantee, only about one-fifth of the accounts are in
shortfall (22.3%).
Moreover, for the no-guarantee scenario, the probability mass is much more concentrated
at the left side of the plot, where accounts deep in surplus are found. These have accumulated
large cushions over the guarantee amount, enabling them to withstand even unusually large
equity market crashes before balances fall below the guarantee amounts. Significantly smaller
cushions are evident for the money-back guaranteed IRA, attributed to the costs of providing
the guarantee (see Panel A of Table 2). These expenses constitute a drag on the investable
capital that make it much more likely that a guarantee will eventually pay off.
The fan charts in Figure 5 illustrate path-wise consumption differences between the
guaranteed IRA versus alternative risk-mitigation strategies, when the equity market
unexpectedly plummets by 35% in the year prior to retirement.39 The right side of Panel A
compares consumption and welfare under the no-guarantee IRA versus with the guarantee.
Even after such a severe equity market crash, average retiree consumption without the guarantee
would be about 1–7% higher, and 51–74% of the savers could consume more. Naturally, this
comes at the cost of tolerating inferior downside measures for part of the return distribution.
Yet even the least fortunate 5% quantile of the distribution would not experience disastrous
consumption losses (though losing 5 to 7% of retiree consumption is still considerable). It may
be surprising to some that, even in this rare market crash scenario, a guarantee does not strictly
dominate.

39

Here, we focus only on losses occurring during the last work period, because there is no chance that the balance
can recover before the money-back guarantee is tested. Losses occurring at other times during the accumulation
phase are less of a concern as the test is applied only at age 67.
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Panels B and C evaluate life cycle funds as alternative risk-mitigation technique to
money-back guarantees. Panel B implements the ‘100 minus age’ rule, while Panel C
implements the more risk tolerant ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule. One year prior to retirement, the derisking along the glide paths leaves the life cycle IRAs with equity exposures of only 34% and
35%, respectively, and almost one-quarter of the IRAs could even withstand a 100% loss in the
equity market without their balances falling below the sum of contributions and subsidies. It is
worth noting, however, that the distributions are more evenly arrayed along the x-axis than in
Panel A, so a year before retirement, the share of accounts with balances below the guarantee
amount is significantly higher for the life cycle funds (at 42.3% in Panel B, and 37.6% in Panel
C) than for the no-guarantee IRA, but lower than for the IRA embedding a guarantee.
Reasons that the life cycle funds can fall below the threshold include (i) locking in both
surpluses and deficits early due to de-risking, and (ii) when the nominal interest rate equals 0%,
the bond investment does not contribute to building a cushion over the guarantee amount. Put
differently, due to the early decline in the risky share, the life cycle IRAs forgo earning the risk
premium to an extent that eventually makes shortfalls even more likely. In line with this, the
fan charts reveal that even in an extremely negative capital market scenario, the no-guarantee
IRA yields superior average consumption than the life cycle funds, but the downside is not
much worse. Importantly, within life cycle funds, the more risk tolerant allocation (Panel C)
does better on consumption and downside, as it allows the individual to retain more equity risk
premium.

6

Conclusions
This study illustrates how money-back guarantees in individual retirement accounts can

alter lifetime consumption opportunities and portfolio decisions. We build and calibrate a
dynamic life cycle model where the saver in an IRA of the German Riester type has access to
stocks, bonds, and IRAs, and we show that old-age consumption could rise substantially for
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most people if the money-back guarantee were eliminated. This is because removing the IRA
guarantee saves money otherwise spent to provide the guarantee, which could instead be
directly invested to the benefit of the saver.
During what many believed to be a ‘normal’ long-term capital market environment, with
a 3% nominal interest rate, we show that average retirement consumption could have risen by
2–4% if the IRA fully invested in equities had no guarantee. Moreover, three-quarters of savers
could have consumed more early in retirement, rising to above 90% of retirees near the end of
life. Accordingly, a money-back guarantee for an IRA is evidently not a cost-effective way to
overcome longevity risk for the older population. Of course giving up the guarantee does expose
participants to shortfall risks that must be weighed against the higher return potential. We show
that switching to a non-guaranteed IRA would have been appealing overall, even though those
experiencing extremely adverse capital market shocks could experience losses compared to the
guarantee case.
In a persistent low interest rate environment, our results are more nuanced. It remains the
case that average consumption would rise by 3–11% if the guarantee were removed, but the
fraction of people experiencing shortfalls also increases to 18.1%. Accordingly, examining
heterogeneity in outcomes becomes important. Remarkably, the vast majority of low to middle
lifetime earners are better served in terms of old-age consumption if they do not have the
money-back guarantee; higher income savers benefit the most from the guarantee. Additionally,
in a persistent low return scenario, industry providers may be unwilling to offer guaranteed
IRAs if they must systematically run losses to make up for shortfalls not covered by hedging
payoffs. Such obligations could eventually force IRA providers to abandon the market, which
would be detrimental to the future of the funded private retirement system. If a real rather than
a nominal investment guarantee were required, this would harm savers even more.
Against this background, we also investigated whether life cycle or target date funds
could be considered to be a viable alternative to the money-back IRA guarantee approach. For
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example, the Pan-European Personal Pension Product includes such a strategy as a possible
default investment option. Our results confirm that the appeal depends on the interest rate
environment and the design of the glide path. In a normal interest rate environment, a life cycle
fund results in less old-age consumption compared to the money-back approach. By contrast,
in a low interest rate environment, life cycle funds can provide consumption comparable to that
under the money-back guarantee scenario. For instance, a life cycle fund with a conservative
equity exposure such as the traditional ‘100 minus age’ rule, results in lower old-age
consumption for both the normal and low interest rate scenarios. By contrast, a life cycle
approach with a higher equity exposure maintained longer (e.g. reducing a 100% equity after
age 40 by 2.5 percentage points per year) can generate higher consumption.
We additionally show that, even under quite extreme stock market crash scenarios, IRAs
without guarantees perform well compared to the alternatives. Thus if the market declined by
35% during the employee’s last year of work, average consumption without a guarantee would
still exceed that with a guarantee or a life cycle fund of the type examined here. This superior
consumption can be attributed to deficiencies in the alternatives: the erosion of IRA assets due
to guarantee costs in the money-back case, and the too-early risky share decline in life cycle
funds.
In sum, our work confirms that money-back guarantees were an effective way to protect
workers from investment losses in their IRAs during a ‘normal’ capital market environment.
Unfortunately, now that interest rates are persistently low, the money-back guaranteed
retirement account does not protect the saving public. Instead, the guarantee can cause
unintended harm, by eroding old-age consumption below what it would be otherwise. Life cycle
funds with sufficient equity exposure can be an alternative risk mitigation strategy, and we
show these are preferable to a guaranteed IRA.
Our findings are relevant to policymakers, regulators, and plan sponsors globally, insofar
as many countries are responding to the challenges of population aging by implementing funded
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individual retirement accounts. These include the U.S. 401(k) retirement accounts, the PEPP
recently launched by the European Parliament, and defined contribution plans in Australia,
Hong Kong, and Chile, along with many other countries. Of key importance in such funded
pension systems is the appropriate design of default investment options which, on the one hand,
protect savers from downside risks, while on the other hand, preserve the opportunity for savers
to access the capital markets. In particular, regulators will benefit from a clearer understanding
of the costs and benefits associated with money-back guarantees, as well as other risk mitigation
techniques such as life cycle funds.
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Figure 1: Life Cycle Profiles With and Without IRA Guarantee: Base Case
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Note: The Figure shows mean values of labor and pension income, non-housing consumption, financial asset
holdings (bonds, stocks, and Riester account balances), and retirement plan payouts (in €2015). Panel A refers to
the base case, where the nominal risk-free rate is 3% and inflation is 1.75%. Stock investments earn a risk premium
of 6% and volatility of 21.41%. Preference parameters include a discount factor of 𝛽 = 0.93 and relative risk
aversion of 𝛾 = 7. Panel B refers to the otherwise identical case without a money-back guarantee in the IRA. Mean
values are calculated based on 100,000 simulated life cycles which rely on optimal policies that were derived for
all possible combinations of current income, cash on hand, IRA balances, guarantee amounts, and annuity payouts.
Prior to retirement at age 67, the IRA is fully invested in equities, from age 67 to 84 the asset allocation consists
of 20% stocks, and 80% bonds. From age 85 onward, the plan pays out a lifetime annuity. See Section 3 for details.
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Figure 2: IRA Participation Rates and Plan Contributions as a Percent of Gross Labor
Income by Age: Base Case
Panel A: Participation rates
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Note: Panel A shows the fraction of individuals making contributions to the IRA by age under the two alternative
scenarios. For additional notes on base case parameters, see Figure 1. Panel B of the Figure illustrates the pattern
of average contributions (including subsidies) to IRAs (conditional on participation) as a percent of gross labor
income by age, with and without a money-back guarantee. Results are drawn from 100,000 simulated optimal life
cycles.
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Figure 3: Consumption Differences and Percent Better off by Age Without versus With
the IRA Guarantee: Base Case

Note: The fan chart at the top of the Figure illustrates path-wise differences in non-housing consumption drawn
from 100,000 simulated optimal life cycles for IRAs without versus with a money-back guarantee. The cyan line
represents the mean consumption difference, while darker areas indicate a higher probability density (between the
5 and 95% quantiles). Differences are expressed as a percent of optimal consumption with the money-back
guarantee. The bottom panel shows the percentage of individuals with higher optimal consumption without versus
with the money-back guarantee. For further notes on base case parameters see Figure 1.
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Figure 4: Heterogeneity of Impacts by Lifetime Income of Abolishing the IRA
Guarantee: Contributions and Old-Age Consumption
Panel A: 𝒊𝒇 = 3%, 𝝅 = 1.75%

Panel B: 𝒊𝒇 = 0%, 𝝅 = 0%

Note: This Figure illustrates the effects of abolishing the money-back guarantee on total contributions (including
subsidies; in percent of average labor income), and average non-housing consumption during retirement, by
average lifetime earnings for a normal (Panel A) and a low (Panel B) interest rate and inflation scenario. Changes
in consumption are in percent of the guarantee case. Consumption increases (decreases) are indicated by green
(purple) circles and color intensity is stronger for larger changes (white circles indicate tiny changes). Results are
drawn from 100,000 simulated optimal life cycles. Further notes on parameters see Figure 1.
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Figure 5: Consumption and Welfare after an Equity Market Crash in the Low Interest
Rate Scenario
Panel A: With guarantee vs. without guarantee

Panel B: With guarantee vs. life cycle fund ‘100 minus age’

Panel C: With guarantee vs. life cycle fund ‘100-until-40, -2.5’

Note: The figure shows the performance of various risk-mitigation techniques in the low interest scenario. We
consider schemes with money-back guarantee and alternatives without guarantee (Panel A), and life cycle funds,
which govern the equity share according to a ‘100 minus age’ rule (Panel B) and a ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule (Panel
C). The histograms illustrate the frequency of the distance to guarantee payoff, which is the last work period’s
return that would equate the IRA balance at retirement to the guarantee amount. The fan charts show path-wise
differences in consumption given that an unanticipated equity market crash of -35% happens in the period before
retirement for IRAs with guarantees versus IRAs with alternative risk-mitigation techniques. All remaining
explanations are analogous to those of Figure 3.
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Table 1:

Costs and Benefits of IRA Money-back Guarantees for Participants and
Providers (as a % of total contributions)

Investment horizon (years)
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30

20

10

Panel A: Guarantee Costs Charged to Participant
if = 3%

9.7

10.7

11.2

10.9

if = 0%

35.8

30.8

25.7

19.0

Panel B: Mean Guarantee Payouts to Participant
if = 3%

3.1

4.3

5.8

7.6

if = 0%

21.9

21.0

19.5

16.9

Panel C: Mean Profits for Provider (Put Hedge Approach)
if = 3%

2.2

1.6

0.7

-0.8

if = 0%

-7.0

-6.7

-6.3

-5.5

Note: Table 1 reports as a % of total contributions the costs (Panel A), mean payouts to the IRA participant (Panel
B), and mean profits of the product provider resulting from using fairly-priced put options to hedge the moneyback guarantee on contributions (Panel C). The example assumes constant annual contributions, and the guarantee
is provided at the end of the investment horizon. The product provider buys at-the-money put options maturing at
retirement to hedge downside risk for each contribution amount. Option pricing follows Black and Scholes (1973)
with an assumed equity volatility of 21.41% p.a. and interest rates of 3% and 0%. The simulation relies on 100,000
Monte Carlo paths using the same volatility and an equity risk premium of 6%.
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Table 2:

Heterogeneity Analysis for High, Middle, and Low Income Workers: Base
Case

Lifetime income
Guarantee

Top 10%
With

Middle 10%

Without

With

Bottom 10%

Without

With

Without

Panel A: Consumption (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

18.34

100%

15.35

100%

11.88

100%

Age 40–59

23.05

101%

15.79

100%

11.26

100%

Age 60–79

25.17

102%

14.91

101%

9.02

101%

Age 80–100

23.65

103%

14.17

104%

7.29

103%

Panel B: Liquid Savings (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

19.83

99%

9.40

99%

2.88

99%

Age 40–59

77.47

99%

16.56

97%

3.50

97%

Age 60–79

76.81

97%

21.85

92%

8.13

90%

Age 80–100

7.17

93%

1.67

91%

0.68

82%

Panel C: IRA Balance (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

6.00

108%

2.50

109%

0.30

120%

Age 40–59

66.57

108%

29.31

110%

4.09

120%

Age 60–79

136.82

109%

65.17

111%

12.74

122%

Age 80–84

31.73

109%

15.06

111%

2.94

121%

Panel D: IRA Payouts (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 67: lump sum

31.03

108%

15.18

112%

4.07

124%

Age 68–84: drawdown

10.87

109%

5.16

111%

1.01

121%

Age 85–100: annuity

18.06

109%

8.61

111%

1.79

122%

Panel E: Share of Consumption and Housing Costs Financed by IRA Payouts (%)
Age 68–84: drawdown

29.6

31.7

19.9

21.7

4.6

5.4

Age 85–100: annuity

51.3

54.1

32.8

35.2

7.5

8.8

3.9

0.0

5.7

0.0

11.5

Panel F: IRA Shortfall Probability (%)
Age 67

0.0

Note: Panels A–D of Table 2 show mean values (in €1,000) of annual non-housing consumption, liquid assets,
IRA balances, and payouts, by age ranges, for the top 10%, middle 10%, and bottom 10% of lifetime income
earners. Results for columns labeled ‘Without’ indicate the percent of the respective guarantee values. Panel E
quantifies the share (in %) of both consumption and housing costs financed by after-tax payouts from the IRA.
Panel F reports the share of simulations where the IRA value at retirement falls short of the sum of contributions
and subsidies. IRA assets are held entirely in stocks until retirement (protected with the hedges described above),
while after retirement only 20% is allocated to stocks and 80% to bonds. Subgroups are generated using 1,000,000
simulation optimal life cycle paths and summing up individual lifetime labor incomes (all in real terms). For further
notes on base case parameters see Figure 1.
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Table 3:

Percent of Individuals by Age and Lifetime Income Decile Having Higher
Consumption Without versus With the IRA Guarantee: Base Case

Age

25–39

40–59

60–79

80–100

Top 10%

59

72

68

81

Middle 10%

58

61

75

88

Bottom 10%

51

46

72

89

Note: Table 3 reports the percent of individuals having higher non-housing consumption without the money-back
guarantee, by age and lifetime income decile. Subgroups are generated using 1,000,000 simulation paths for
optimal life cycles, adding up individual lifetime labor incomes (in real terms). The baseline case calibration uses
a nominal risk-free rate of 3% and inflation rate of 1.75%.

Table 4:

Percent of Individuals by Age and Lifetime Income Decile Having Positive IRA
Contributions, Without versus With the IRA Guarantee: Base Case

Age

25–39

40–59
Without

With

60–66

Guarantee

With

Without

With

Without

Top 10%

63

64

84

90

68

71

Middle 10%

38

39

67

68

62

64

Bottom 10%

10

11

35

35

67

71

Note: Table 4 reports the percent of individuals with positive contribution rates with and without the money-back
guarantee, by age and lifetime income decile. Subgroups are generated using 1,000,000 simulation paths, adding
up individual lifetime labor incomes (in real terms). For further notes on base case parameters see Figure 1.
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Table 5:

Impacts of Different Guarantees: Base Case
With
(nominal)

Guarantee
if




Without

With
(real)

With
(nominal)

Without

3%

0%

1.75%

0%

With
(real)

Panel A: Consumption (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

15.22

100%

100%

15.15

100%

Age 40–59

16.24

100%

100%

15.86

101%

Age 60–79

15.64

101%

98%

14.28

103%

Age 80–100

14.55

104%

94%

11.17

111%

Same as
for With
(nominal)

Panel B: Liquid Savings (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

9.92

99%

103%

10.77

95%

Age 40–59

24.61

98%

105%

31.49

89%

Age 60–79

28.67

94%

108%

41.45

82%

Age 80–100

2.25

90%

103%

3.74

67%

Panel C: IRA Balance (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

2.66

109%

73%

0.77

287%

Age 40–59

31.05

109%

81%

11.56

204%

Age 60–79

68.11

110%

83%

25.44

178%

Age 80–84

15.74

110%

84%

5.12

175%

Panel D: IRA Payouts (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 67: lump sum

15.92

111%

83%

7.92

150%

Age 68–84: drawdown

5.40

110%

84%

1.91

175%

Age 85–100: annuity

9.02

111%

84%

3.17

170%

Panel E: Share of Consumption and Housing Costs Financed by IRA Payouts (%)
Age 68–84: drawdown

20.2

21.9

17.4

8.3

13.8

Age 85–100: annuity

33.9

36.3

30.0

14.9

23.2

6.4

0.0

0.0

18.1

Panel F: IRA Shortfall Probability (%)
Age 67

0.0

Note: Panels A–D of Table 5 show mean values (in €1,000) of annual non-housing consumption, liquid assets,
IRA balances, and payouts for a real rather than a nominal money-back guarantee (the latter as percent of the
guarantee case). Panel E quantifies the share (in %) of both consumption and housing costs which is financed by
after-tax payouts from the IRA. Panel F reports the share of simulations where the IRA value at retirement falls
short of the sum of contributions and subsidies. For the first three specifications the nominal risk-free rate and
inflation rate are assumed as constant at rates of 𝑖𝑓 = 3% and 𝜋 = 1.75%, and the equity risk premium is 6% (with
volatility of 21.41%). The latter three specifications refer to a low interest rate and inflation scenario with rates of
𝑖𝑓 = 0% and 𝜋 = 0%. Naturally, for zero inflation the results for the real guarantee match those of the nominal
guarantee.
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Table 6:

Outcomes of Alternative Life Cycle Risk Mitigation Techniques versus IRA
Money-Back Guarantee
With
guarantee

Plan design
if




LC fund
‘100–age’

LC fund
‘100-until40, -2.5’

With
guarantee

LC fund
‘100–age’

3%

0%

1.75%

0%

LC fund
‘100-until40, -2.5’

Panel A: Consumption (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

15.22

100%

100%

15.15

100%

100%

Age 40–59

16.24

100%

100%

15.86

100%

101%

Age 60–79

15.64

95%

97%

14.28

99%

100%

Age 80–100

14.55

85%

92%

11.17

98%

101%

Panel B: Liquid Savings (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

9.92

106%

98%

10.77

100%

97%

Age 40–59

24.61

104%

94%

31.49

99%

94%

Age 60–79

28.67

109%

96%

41.45

95%

90%

Age 80–100

2.25

90%

75%

3.74

87%

81%

Panel C: IRA Balance (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

2.66

77%

117%

0.77

199%

279%

Age 40–59

31.05

80%

109%

11.56

126%

169%

Age 60–79

68.11

62%

82%

25.44

98%

122%

Age 80–84

15.74

60%

79%

5.12

93%

114%

Panel D: IRA Payouts (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 67: lump sum

15.92

56%

76%

7.92

92%

107%

Age 68–84: drawdown

5.40

60%

79%

1.91

93%

115%

Age 85–100: annuity

9.02

59%

78%

3.17

93%

113%

Panel E: Share of Consumption and Housing Costs Financed by IRA Payouts (%)
Age 68–84: drawdown

20.2

13.3

16.9

8.3

7.8

9.5

Age 85–100: annuity

33.9

23.4

28.9

14.9

14.1

16.7

0.9

1.3

0.0

18.7

17.6

Panel F: IRA Shortfall Probability (%)
Age 67

0.0

Note: Panels A–D of Table 6 show mean values (in €1,000) of annual non-housing consumption, liquid assets,
IRA balances, and payouts, by age ranges, for three plan designs and two capital market environments, with the
money-back guarantee. Results for columns labeled LC fund ‘100–age’ and LC fund ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ indicate
the percent of the respective guarantee values. Panel E quantifies the share (in %) of both consumption and housing
costs financed by after-tax payouts from the IRA. Panel F reports the share of simulations where the IRA value at
retirement falls short of the sum of contributions and subsidies. The first three (second three) columns use a
nominal risk-free rate of 3% (0%) and inflation rate of 1.75% (0%), respectively. For the plan design with the
guarantee, IRA contributions (minus put premiums) are invested entirely in stocks until retirement. For the life
cycle funds, the fraction of assets invested in risky stocks versus bonds is specified according to a ‘100–age’ rule
(or ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule, respectively) with no money-back guarantee. To maintain consistency, in all plan
designs, after retirement only 20% is allocated to stocks and 80% to bonds.
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Table 7:

Percent of Individuals with Higher Consumption with a Life Cycle Fund
versus a Money-Back Guarantee IRA

Age

25–39

40–59

60–79

80–100

Panel A: ‘Normal’ Capital Markets (𝒊𝒇 = 3%, 𝝅 = 1.75%)
‘100-age’ rule

47

42

33

32

‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule

40

48

43

46

Panel B: ‘Low Return’ Capital Markets (𝒊𝒇 = 0%, 𝝅 = 0%)
‘100-age’ rule

35

61

43

44

‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule

34

64

54

55

Note: Table 7 shows the fraction (in %) of individuals having higher non-housing consumption under two life
cycle risk mitigation strategies, relative to a money-back guarantee and 100% equity allocation throughout the
accumulation phase. To determine the percentage equity allocation, the first life cycle fund applies a relatively
conservative ‘100-age’ rule, and the second one is fully invested in equities until age 40 and then reduces its equity
allocation by 2.5 percentage points per year (termed ‘100-until-40, -2.5’ rule). To maintain consistency, in all plan
designs, after retirement only 20% are allocated to stocks and 80% to bonds. Panel A considers the ‘normal’ capital
market scenario (nominal risk-free rate of 3% and inflation rate of 1.75%) and Panel B addresses the low return
environment (nominal risk-free rate and inflation rate of 0%).
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Online Appendix A: Income Taxation and Social Security Contributions
Our model embeds the German social security and tax regulations as realistically as
possible, though below, we show that these institutional details can be generalized to other
nations (see Online Appendix F). The state-organized social insurance system includes
contributions to pension, unemployment, health, and nursing care insurance. During the
worklife, employees and employers each contribute 9.35% of gross labor income to the
statutory pension system and 1.5% to unemployment insurance (to an assessment ceiling of
€71,400 p.a.). Health insurance costs 7.3% of labor income and nursing care insurance amounts
to 1.175% for employees (to an assessment ceiling of €48,600 p.a.). Retirees do not pay pension
and unemployment insurance contributions, but they pay 7.3% from pension income for health
and 2.35% for nursing care insurance.
Federal income taxes are charged based on taxable income, which is gross income less (in
part) contributions to the state-organized social insurance system, contributions and subsidies
paid into tax-qualified IRAs, and several tax-exempt amounts. In 2015, 80% of both the
employee’s and employer’s contribution to the statutory pension system could be deducted.
This tax deductible contribution is increasing in 2% increments, such that in 2025, the full
amount can be deducted. In addition, an individual’s payments to nursing care insurance and
96% of the contribution to health insurance are tax deductible. The latter two may be increased
by unemployment insurance contributions as long as the sum of the three is below €1,900.
Furthermore, taxable income is reduced by income-related standard deductions of €1,000 for
employees and €102 for retirees. In the context of our model, contributions and subsidies paid
to Riester IRAs are tax deductible up to an annual limit of €2,100.
The progressive German income tax system grants tax-exemption on the first €8,354 of
taxable income. Between €8,254 and €52,881, marginal tax rates increase from 14% up to 42%
of taxable income. For income above €250,730 the marginal tax rate is 45%. Taxes determined
by these regulations are additionally increased by a solidarity supplement tax of 5.5%. The
following figure illustrates the share of total deductions as percentage of gross income (𝑐𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑇 ),
i.e. social security and tax payments, for both employees and retirees.
Deductions: Taxes + social security

50%
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35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
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0%
0

20
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80
100
Gross labor income (€1,000)
Work life

120

140
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Note: This Figure represents the share of deductions (in %) from gross labor income resulting from income taxes
and contributions to the German social insurance system. The Figure assumes a worker (retiree) with no children
and no contributions to (income from) tax-qualified IRAs.
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Online Appendix B: Rental Costs and Number of Children
Panel A: Rental Costs as Share
of Net Income

Panel B: Number of Children Living
with the Parents

45%

2.0

40%

1.8

35%

1.6
1.4

30%

1.2
25%
1.0
20%
0.8
15%

0.6

10%

0.4

5%

0.2

0%

0.0
25

35

45

55

65
Age

75

85

95

25

30

35

40

45 50
Age

55

60

65

Note: Panel A of this Figure illustrates tenants’ rental costs as a fraction of net income (ℎ𝑡 ). Raw data are from all
waves of SOEP from 1990 to 2015. The definition of housing costs for tenants is broad; besides rental payments
we include costs for hot and cold water, heating, garbage disposal, and cleaning services. Housing costs in SOEP
are provided solely at the household level, so costs are divided by the aggregate of head’s and – if present –
spouse’s net income. The population refers to all households in the panel, irrespective of the potential presence of
spouses. The subsamples of females and males do indicate singles’ housing costs, but in the model we use
population values to avoid the need to make assumptions about relationship status. Panel B illustrates the average
number of children living in a household with parents over the life cycle. Raw data were taken from all waves of
the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) from 1984–2015.
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Online Appendix C: Labor Income Process
Estimation of the discretized Markovian income process relies on non-zero labor income
observations of employed persons aged 25–67 from all waves of SOEP until year 2015. All
income figures are converted to year 2015 prices (measured in €1,000) and in all specifications
and for every age we drop the top and bottom 1% of observations to diminish effects of outliers.
Next, each remaining observation is assigned to one of 𝑛𝑠 equally-sized income levels. The
lowest (highest) 1/𝑛𝑠 of observations are assigned to income level 1 (level 𝑛𝑠 ), etc.40 To
estimate deterministic annual income, we conduct pooled OLS regressions for each income
level 𝑠, where the natural logarithm of labor income, ln 𝑌𝑡,𝑠 , is regressed on first- and secondorder polynomials in age and year fixed effects. Estimated coefficients are then used to
determine predicted age-dependent log income figures, converted to level values and
interpreted to (roughly) indicate the level’s middle income.
The second component of the labor income process is the variation of observed log income,
ln 𝑌𝑡,𝑠 , around the regression-based predicted values, ln 𝑌̂𝑡,𝑠 . Using the standard deviation of the
difference, 𝜎𝑢,𝑠 , as a measure of dispersion, a purely transitory shock is added to the level’s
deterministic trend. The natural logarithm of the shock is assumed to be normally distributed
2
2
with ln 𝑈𝑡,𝑠 ~𝑁(−0.5𝜎𝑢,𝑠
, 𝜎𝑢,𝑠
) and is intended to reflect additional variation in income beyond
transitions between income states.
Finally we estimate a Markov transition matrix, which quantifies the probabilities of
migrating from current income state 𝑠𝑡 to all other income states in the next period. To derive
migration probabilities, we only consider cases where consecutive observations from one age
to the next are available and no change in the highest level of education has occurred. Both the
transitory shock component within a level and transition probabilities are assumed to be ageinvariant.
Panel A of Table C.1 shows state-dependent coefficients of the labor earnings regression
(all being significant at the 1% confidence level). Panel B reports the standard deviations 𝜎𝑢,𝑠
between observed (log) income 𝑌𝑡,𝑠 from predicted (log) income 𝑌̂𝑡,𝑠 for all levels. The variation
is U-shaped in income level, meaning that heterogeneity in labor earnings is higher at more
extreme income levels. In addition, the top and bottom level variation is more than twice as
high as of the adjacent levels. Panel C quantifies the transition probabilities 𝑞𝑠𝑡,𝑠𝑡+1 from current
income level 𝑠𝑡 to level 𝑠𝑡+1 in the next period. Shading in the Table is darker the higher the
probability. The likelihood of remaining in the same income level is especially high for top and
bottom income deciles, but also for middle income receivers remaining in the same level is the
most likely event.
Table C.2 compares the empirical moments of the SOEP data, and of simulated labor
income from applying the Markovian and Carroll and Samwick (1997) methods. Despite
simplifications with respect to age-independence of transitory shock components and migration
probabilities, the empirical moments over age ranges of 10 years are sufficiently close to infer
that the Markovian method adequately simulates labor income.
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Increasing the number of income levels 𝑛𝑠 , is expected to improve the fit between raw data and simulated income
data, but also increases model runtime. Overall, we find that for the total population and subsamples of females
and males 𝑛𝑠 = 10 achieves a satisfactory fit of the distribution parameters of the SOEP data (see Table C.2).
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Table C.1:

Gross Labor Income Parameters Estimated by Deciles using SOEP

Panel A: Regression Coefficients from Estimated Models of Log Labor Income by Income Decile
Income decile st

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Constant

2.479
(63.25)

2.739
(134.75)

2.811
(123.44)

2.825
(220.05)

2.861
(277.13)

2.851
(267.68)

2.884
(247.69)

2.860
(205.92)

2.786
(148.21)

2.500
(72.24)

Age / 100

1.093
(5.57)

1.356
(13.12)

1.916
(15.72)

2.454
(37.62)

2.737
(53.19)

3.233
(61.58)

3.493
(60.53)

4.090
(61.29)

5.121
(54.70)

7.782
(45.78)

Age² / (100)²

-1.439
(-6.08)

-1.613
(-12.68)

-2.150
(-14.13)

-2.655
(-33.08)

-2.878
(-45.93)

-3.372
(-53.02)

-3.522
(-50.36)

-4.051
(-50.16)

-5.050
(-44.06)

-7.794
(-37.90)

Number of obs.
F
Prob > F
Adj. R-squared

17,502

17,463

17,459

17,391

17,382

17,449

17,449

17,399

17,515

17,407

4.01

8.72

43.89

168.32

308.38

395.63

475.42

502.74

537.94

262.73

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.018

0.046

0.151

0.374

0.543

0.620

0.659

0.669

0.661

0.452

Panel B: Standard Deviation: Difference of Actual from Predicted Log Labor Income
Income decile st
u,s

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0.166

0.073

0.055

0.043

0.037

0.038

0.043

0.053

0.069

0.158

Panel C: Transition Probabilities between Labor Income Deciles 𝒔𝒕 , 𝒔𝒕+𝟏 (%)

st+1

st
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

61.90
18.07
7.63
4.17
2.78
1.67
1.23
1.05
0.97
0.52

25.09
45.69
15.30
6.03
2.92
1.97
1.15
0.82
0.56
0.47

5.94
22.51
41.14
15.95
6.49
3.73
1.85
1.26
0.77
0.37

2.72
6.18
21.25
38.51
17.88
7.12
3.52
1.61
0.77
0.43

1.70
2.94
7.04
21.41
36.64
18.18
7.07
3.01
1.46
0.56

0.98
1.83
3.53
7.35
20.99
37.35
18.30
6.40
2.40
0.87

0.65
1.20
1.92
3.62
7.54
20.20
39.97
18.38
5.03
1.51

0.54
0.81
1.16
1.75
2.92
6.62
20.10
45.18
17.77
3.16

0.34
0.43
0.65
0.76
1.25
2.34
5.32
19.05
55.35
14.49

0.24
0.30
0.34
0.45
0.56
0.81
1.52
3.21
14.94
77.62

Note: Panel A of Table C.1 reports regression coefficients and t-statistics for gross labor income deciles estimated
using the SOEP (see text); all coefficients are significant at the 1% level. Panel B shows the standard deviation of
differences between annual logs of labor income and the regression’s fitted values within each income level. Panel
C depicts the conditional transition probabilities 𝑞𝑠𝑡,𝑠𝑡+1 from the individual’s current income level 𝑠𝑡 to all possible
future income levels 𝑠𝑡+1 . The darkness of the shading is proportional to the transition probability. Standard
deviations and transition probabilities are assumed to be age-invariant. Observations with implied hourly wages
below 80% of year 2015’s minimum wage and employees working below 20 hours per week are excluded from
the estimation. A minimum wage of €8.50 was introduced in 2015 (i.e. all SOEP observations are from the preminimum wage period) and omitting this data filter would result in inclusion of observations illegal under current
law.
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Table C.2:

Moments of Labor Income (Entire Workforce)

Age

25–34

35–44

45–54

55–64

29.54
33.76
31.51

35.12
38.07
34.77

36.07
39.62
35.35

31.12
37.90
33.18

13.80
13.64
8.40

17.42
18.34
13.93

17.78
20.35
17.85

19.60
19.06
19.82

0.15
0.91
0.81

0.73
1.17
1.25

0.79
1.24
1.64

0.76
1.13
2.06

2.73
4.12
4.27

3.43
4.51
5.89

3.50
4.58
8.08

3.22
4.29
12.41

Panel A: Mean
SOEP
Markov chain
Carroll and Samwick (1997)
Panel B: Standard deviation
SOEP
Markov chain
Carroll and Samwick (1997)
Panel C: Skewness
SOEP
Markov chain
Carroll and Samwick (1997)
Panel D: Kurtosis
SOEP
Markov chain
Carroll and Samwick (1997)

Note: Table C.2 reports the empirical moments of labor income for observed SOEP data as well as for two datagenerating processes. Annual labor income measured in €1,000 refers to the total workforce. The method denoted
‘Markov chain’ is employed in the model (discussed in Section 3.3). The benchmark method is from Carroll and
Samwick (1997) using the regression model ln 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 ∙

𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
100

𝑎𝑔𝑒 2

+ 𝛾2 ∙ (100)𝑖,𝑡2 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 and resulting coefficients

𝛾0 = 2.6926, 𝛾1 = 3.7645, 𝛾2 = −4.0241 (all significant at the 1% level); the variance of the permanent income
shock 𝜎𝑛2 = 1.69% and variance of the transitory income shock 𝜎𝑢2 = 5.84%. Using Carroll and Samwick’s
method, Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2010) and Krebs and Yao (2016) find similar permanent, but higher transitory
shock components for Germany. The lower transitory shock in our estimation is attributed to the additional data
filters applied (outlined in Table C.1). Reported numbers are mean values over age ranges of 10 years from 100,000
simulation paths.
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Online Appendix D: Parameter Matching: Base Case
120

Financial wealth (€1,000)

100

80

60

40

20

0
23-27

28-32

33-37

38-42
43-47
Age group

PHF empirical mean

48-52

53-57

58-62

Model mean

Note: The Figure shows the value of accumulated financial assets by age in Deutsche Bundesbank’s Panel on
Household Finances (PHF) and mean asset holdings generated from the model. Relying on a matching procedure
related to Love (2010), the calibration with regard to the discount factor 𝛽 and the coefficient of relative risk
aversion 𝛾 is chosen such that the sum of relative squared differences between empirical observations and model
wealth (in real terms) is minimized for five year age groups centered around age 25 to age 60. For the matching
procedure, we use Riester IRAs embedding an investment guarantee, a nominal risk-free interest rate of 3%,
inflation of 1.75%, and an equity risk premium of 6% (with volatility of 21.41%). The best fit is achieved by a
discount factor of 𝛽 = 0.93 combined with relative risk aversion of 𝛾 = 7. Financial wealth derived from PHF
comprises all forms of fixed income, equity, pension accounts, and other investments (including real estate funds,
managed accounts, etc.), while model wealth is the sum of direct stock and bond holdings plus IRA balances. As
the PHF reports asset holdings other than IRAs only at the household level, individual values are derived by
dividing household assets by two if a spouse is present and then adding individual pension accounts.
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Online Appendix E: Results with Epstein-Zin-Weil Preferences, and with Front-End
Loads on Contributions
The use of CRRA preferences links the coefficient of risk aversion (𝛾) and the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (EIS), inasmuch as one is the inverse of the other. To free up these
parameters, we also investigate results using the Epstein-Zin-Weil utility formulation (Epstein
and Zin, 1989; Weil, 1989); this approach allows independent preferences for smoothing across
time and states. Here, consumption differences for the alternative guarantee designs are affected
in two ways. First, lowering (increasing) the EIS means relative risk aversion is smaller (larger)
than 1/EIS, so the individual will devote less (more) emphasis on consumption smoothing
across states, compared to CRRA preferences. This should decrease (increase) the overall
demand for saving and narrow (increase) differences in resulting retiree consumption under the
guarantee. Second, the relative attractiveness of the scheme with/without guarantee changes.
The guaranteed IRA provides smaller variation in payouts, but it also pays off less compared to
the non-guaranteed IRA. For low (higher) levels of EIS, this makes the guaranteed IRA less
(more) attractive relative to the non-guaranteed IRA, due to the consumer’s weaker preference
for smoothing across states.
Two effects work in opposite directions, so it is theoretically unclear which effect
dominates. To resolve this, the first four columns of Table E.1 provide results using EpsteinZin-Weil preferences (as in Córdoba and Ripoll, 2017) for the base case calibration. Holding
fixed the coefficient of relative risk aversion, we then reduce (increase) the CRRA-implied
𝐸𝐼𝑆 = 1/𝛾 = 1/7 to 0.1 (0.2), to permit an assessment of changing the EIS on IRA and liquid
savings demand, and on resulting consumption opportunities. Lowering the EIS produces a
substantial decline in total savings, by about 13% between ages 60–79 (Panels B and C) relative
to the CRRA case with the IRA guarantee, and an even larger reduction, of about 18%, relative
to the CRRA case and no guarantee (Table 5, columns 1 and 2).41 Moreover, for both guarantee
designs, the IRA share as percent of total assets falls between 3.3 and 6.5 percentage points.42
Accordingly, removing the guarantee enhances savers’ wellbeing less, driven by the substantial
reduction in overall savings more than by a change in relative attractiveness of the two
guarantee designs.
When the EIS is increased to 0.2, the opposite effects obtain. Total saving rises by 25% for
the guarantee case, due to the stronger demand for smoothing across states compared to results
using CRRA parameters. The IRA provides better smoothing across states than liquid savings,
due to the embedded deferred annuity, so a higher EIS value translates to more of the portfolio
being held in the IRA. The IRA share as a percent of total assets rises slightly more, by 6.4%
for the guaranteed IRA versus 5.7% for the non-guaranteed scheme. The consumption
improvement resulting from removing the IRA guarantee is greater when the EIS rises, relative
to the CRRA case.
In sum, of the two channels through which EIS affects consumption, the adjustment in total
savings dominates the effect of changing the guarantee’s attractiveness. Also, the positive effect
of abolishing the guarantee rises when the EIS is higher, meaning that individuals favor
consumption smoothing more strongly across states. Somewhat counterintuitively, the
guaranteed IRA that smooths consumption more loses ground to the non-guaranteed alternative,
because the increased consumption gained by abolishing the guarantee compensates for the
individual’s benefit of smoother consumption. In summary, then, results using Epstein-ZinWeil preferences confirm the conclusions of prior sections: a non-guaranteed IRA considerably
enhances consumption relative to that feasible with a guaranteed IRA.
41
42

As the IRA is fully depleted beyond age 84, asset holdings in the final periods cannot be analyzed accurately.
For the guarantee case, it falls from 70.4% to 67.0%, and with no guarantee, from 73.6% to 67.1%.
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Moreover, thus far we have abstracted from sales charges levied on IRA contributions, yet
in the German context, investing in an IRA requires payment of front-end loads (no fees are
charged on redemptions during the payout phase). Such fees could affect the demand for
guarantees for two reasons. First, the loads might render the IRAs so unattractive that savers
could contribute little or nothing. In such a case, the guarantee specifications become irrelevant.
Second, the loads could interact with expensive guarantee costs and discourage IRA investors
from contributing. In this latter case, the IRA’s appeal would be enhanced by abolishing the
guarantee, and consumption without a guaranteed IRA might be even greater than with the
guarantee (as illustrated in Section 4).
The final two columns of Table E.1 document that IRA investments are still substantial,
even with a front-end load of 5% on contributions. Yet unsurprisingly, Panels C and D show
that such loads lead to less IRA wealth accumulated for the base calibration; as a consequence,
payouts are also lower than in the absence of such fees (compare the first two columns of Table
5). Importantly, participant contributions do not decline symmetrically. Given the front end
load, lifetime contributions with the guarantee fall by 6.9% (to €20,850); without the guarantee,
contributions drop by only about 3.2% (to €22,400).43 IRA payouts differ by 10–11% without
the extra loads, but by 13% when front-end loads are taken into account. As a result, old-age
consumption differences are greater than without fees. Overall, with realistic sales loads, the
negative consequences of the IRA guarantees are slightly worse.

43

Intuitively, with fees average timing of contributions is a little earlier to give invested capital more time to earn
return (about 0.74 years earlier with a money-back guarantee and 0.32 years in absence of a guarantee).
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Table E.1:

Sensitivity Analysis for Different Preferences and Fees: Base Case

Specification
Guarantee

EZW: lower EIS

EZW: higher EIS

With

With

Without

Front-end load: 5%

Without

With

Without

Panel A: Consumption (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

15.36

100%

15.02

100%

15.22

100%

Age 40–59

16.24

100%

16.25

100%

16.22

100%

Age 60–79

15.15

101%

16.47

102%

15.51

101%

Age 80–100

13.51

101%

16.63

104%

14.14

104%

Panel B: Liquid Savings (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

9.02

101%

11.01

98%

10.11

98%

Age 40–59

22.59

104%

26.04

99%

25.21

97%

Age 60–79

27.74

101%

28.14

94%

30.60

92%

Age 80–100

1.86

94%

2.97

100%

2.51

86%

Panel C: IRA Balance (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

1.72

94%

4.55

110%

2.46

109%

Age 40–59

24.35

99%

44.83

109%

28.95

111%

Age 60–79

56.39

101%

92.83

110%

62.43

113%

Age 80–84

12.97

101%

21.59

110%

14.40

113%

Panel D: IRA Payouts (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 67: lump sum

14.09

100%

20.97

110%

14.67

113%

Age 68–84: drawdown

4.44

101%

7.37

110%

4.94

113%

Age 85–100: annuity

7.53

101%

12.26

110%

8.26

113%

Panel E: Share of Consumption and Housing Costs Financed by IRA Payouts (%)
Age 68–84: drawdown

17.3

17.5

25.6

27.5

18.7

20.8

Age 85–100: annuity

30.0

30.3

41.0

43.3

31.9

34.8

7.9

0.0

4.9

0.0

7.5

Panel F: IRA Shortfall Probability (%)
Age 67

0.0

Note: Panels A–D of Table E.1 report mean values (in €1,000) of annual non-housing consumption, liquid assets,
IRA balances, and payouts, by age ranges, for three different cases with and without guarantee (the latter as percent
of the guarantee case). Panel E quantifies the share (in %) of both consumption and housing costs which is financed
by after-tax payouts from the IRA. Panel F reports the share of simulations where the IRA value at retirement falls
short of the sum of contributions and subsidies. In the first and second case, we allow for Epstein-Zin-Weil (EZW)
preferences in order to disentangle risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). Starting from
the CRRA-implied EIS of 𝜓 = 1/7 = 0.1429 in the first (second) specification, EIS is decreased (increased) to
0.1 (0.2) while holding relative risk aversion constant at 𝛾 = 7. In the third specification a front-end load of 5%
for each contribution (including subsidies) is charged. In all specifications, the nominal risk-free rate and inflation
rate are assumed constant at 𝑖𝑓 = 3% and 𝜋 = 1.75%, and the equity risk premium is 6% (with volatility of 21.41%).

61

Online Appendix F: Illustrating How to Generalize to Other Countries
The results presented in the body of the paper are based on a model calibration which
reflects the specific regulations of the Riester IRA, as well as the German institutional
framework. In this appendix, we confirm that the negative implications of a mandatory moneyback IRA guarantee are not due to uniquely German economic factors, but rather are relevant
to other countries as well.
Despite cross-national differences in tax systems, most developed countries have
progressive income taxes under which high earners are subject to higher tax rates than lower
earners (see Bunn and Asen, 2020; and Online Appendix A for the German case). Most
developed nations also require contributions to a mandatory state-run pay-as-you-go plan
automatically deducted from payrolls that entitle retirees to a lifelong pension income stream.
Access to health insurance usually is gained from automatic payroll deductions, while, of
course, the costs and levels of coverage vary. The German multi-payer health insurance system,
which is financed via payroll deductions also has insurers facing competition to attract
customers; as such, it falls between the centrally organized single-payer system common in the
EU, and the mostly market-based system of the U.S. (Hussey and Anderson, 2003; Thomson et
al., 2013). Therefore, the German tax and social security system can be seen as relevant for
many developed countries.
To generalize the setup of the IRA beyond the German Riester, here we make two
adjustments. First, we assume no payment of subsidies, but we keep the tax deductibility of
contributions of up to €2,100 per year. Exclusion of the subsidy is motivated by the argument
that IRAs are not usually accompanied by matching of contributions by a generous third party
(like the government in case of the Riester IRA, or the employer in U.S. 401(k) plans). Second,
we allow for flexible withdrawals during the entire decumulation phase. We retain the deferred
annuity within the retirement account, as in the German case, since the recent passage of the
SECURE Act in the United States has rendered these insurance products an accepted default
solution (Horneff et al., 2020). Moreover, the literature agrees that annuities are an effective
means of controlling longevity risks (e.g., Davidoff et al., 2005; Horneff et al., 2008). Both
adjustments to the IRA harmonize its setup with respect to international standards. The absence
of subsidies in the model results in lower demand for the IRA, but the less restrictive withdrawal
rules make the account more valuable.
Analogous to Figure 3, the path-wise consumption differences between the internationally
harmonized IRA with and without guarantee is shown in Figure F.1 for the normal interest rate
scenario. The average consumption improvement from abolishing the guarantee remains
positive and economically significant. By the end of the accumulation phase, the average
consumption surplus without a guarantee has grown to 1.04%, and from age 68 to 84 it amounts
to about 1.9%. After the deferred annuity starts paying, the consumption surplus increases to
4.6–5.0% per year.
Compared to the German IRA setup, consumption differences until retirement are almost
unaltered. Due to the flexible withdrawals permitted in this internationally harmonized IRA,
the consumption surplus is about 0.4 percentage points higher in the first 11 years of retirement.
Consumption for both the German and the internationally harmonized setup rises strongly at
age 85 when the deferred annuity starts paying yet the increase is stronger for the internationally
harmonized IRA. This is the consequence of a seemingly higher relative attractiveness of the
no-guarantee versus the guarantee IRA in the international setup. In that context, IRA savings
at retirement and annuity payouts without the guarantee compared to the guarantee case are
three percentage points higher than in the German setup (14% versus 11%), leading to superior
consumption improvements at highest ages. In summary, with respect to the variation of
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consumption surpluses around the mean, there are no substantial differences between results
with the Riester model and with the internationally harmonized IRA.
Table F.1 quantifies the differences in consumption, liquid asset holdings, and IRA
balances and payouts for the internationally harmonized IRA, for comparison with the Riester
results in Table 5. Overall, the effects of abolishing the guarantee on consumption are even
larger for the internationally harmonized IRA, yet IRA balances are lower, indicating that the
benefits from allowing self-selected withdrawals do not offset the lack of subsidies. The slightly
higher consumption difference in the low interest rate scenario for the internationally
harmonized IRA from age 60–79 results from the fact that allowing flexible withdrawals causes
more front-loaded payouts.
These adjustments have been tailored to reflect a more general framework for the IRA
environment, yet the results show that a money-back guarantee also in this more flexible case
erodes most participants’ average consumption.
Figure F.1: Consumption Differences and Percent Better off by Age Without versus With
the IRA Guarantee: International Context (Base Case)

Note: The fan chart at the top of the Figure F.1 illustrates path-wise differences in non-housing consumption drawn
from 100,000 simulated optimal life cycles for internationally harmonized IRAs without versus with a moneyback guarantee. For the internationally harmonized IRA in comparison to the Riester IRA two changes are
assumed. First, the account is not subsidized by any matching contributions; and second, the participant can freely
decide on withdrawals from age 67 until age 84. The cyan line represents the mean consumption difference, while
darker areas indicate a higher probability density (between the 5 and 95% quantiles). Differences are expressed as
a percent of optimal consumption with the money-back guarantee. The bottom panel shows the percentage of
individuals with higher optimal consumption without versus with the money-back guarantee. For further notes on
base case parameters see Figure 1.
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Table F.1:

Impacts of Different Guarantees: International Context

Guarantee

With

Without

if




With

Without

3%

0%

1.75%

0%

Panel A: Consumption (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

15.22

100%

15.15

100%

Age 40–59

16.21

100%

15.84

101%

Age 60–79

15.60

102%

14.21

104%

Age 80–100

14.40

105%

11.05

111%

Panel B: Liquid Savings (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

9.79

98%

10.97

94%

Age 40–59

24.18

98%

32.21

87%

Age 60–79

31.08

93%

44.49

84%

Age 80–100

3.00

92%

4.69

80%

0.58

360%

Panel C: IRA Balance (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 25–39

2.71

119%

Age 40–59

30.14

112%

9.84

227%

Age 60–79

61.22

114%

19.90

194%

Age 80–84

9.21

115%

1.42

218%

Panel D: IRA Payouts (in €1,000 or percent of guarantee case)
Age 67: withdrawal

12.42

111%

7.68

144%

Age 68–84: withdrawal

5.21

114%

1.63

190%

Age 85–100: annuity

8.70

114%

2.85

179%

Panel E: Share of Consumption and Housing Costs Financed by IRA Payouts (%)
Age 68–84: withdrawal

22.0

24.6

8.7

15.4

Age 85–100: annuity

31.3

34.2

12.3

20.4

6.4

0.0

18.5

Panel F: IRA Shortfall Probability (%)
Age 67

0.0

Note: Panels A–D of Table F.1 show mean values (in €1,000) of annual non-housing consumption, liquid assets,
IRA balances, and payouts, by age ranges for an internationally harmonized IRA for which in comparison to the
Riester IRA two changes are assumed. First, the account is not subsidized by any matching contributions; and
second, the participant can freely decide on withdrawals from age 67 until age 84. Results for columns labeled
‘Without’ indicate the percent of the respective guarantee values. Panel E quantifies the share (in %) of both
consumption and housing costs financed by after-tax payouts from the IRA. Panel F reports the share of
simulations where the IRA value at retirement falls short of the sum of contributions and subsidies. IRA assets are
held entirely in stocks until retirement (protected with the hedges described above), while after retirement only
20% is allocated to stocks and 80% to bonds. Averages are generated using 100,000 simulation optimal life cycle
paths (all in real terms). For further notes on base case parameters see Figure 1.
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